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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is rife with disputes over interconnection. These disputes
take many forms, ranging from complaints over unfair peering policies by
"backbones," to assertions that instant messaging is being monopolized, to
arguments for mandatory Internet Service Provider ("ISP") access to cable
television Internet systems, to compensation disputes among local
telephone companies over the delivery of Internet-bound telephone calls.
And yet, despite these controversies and many others, the only legal rules
governing Internet interconnection are a limited number of company-
specific conditions imposed in some merger reviews. Certainly, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") has developed no rules governing
Internet carriers, frankly admitting that it "has struggled with how to treat
Internet traffic for regulatory purposes."' Indeed, it is fair to say that no
comprehensive regulatory scheme exists.
Of course, the FCC's general approach is to declare that the Internet
is competitive and that there is no need for comprehensive regulation; such
regulation, it is said, might even be harmful by stiffing innovation,
increasing costs, or distorting competition. In fact, one chairman said that
the agency would not regulate the Internet because, in that manner, it was
sure to "do no harm.",2 This dominant rhetoric, however, is belied by the
government's action in particular cases. For example, in each of the recent
communications industry megamergers, opponents claimed that the
combination would hurt competition in the Internet. These claims varied
from the assertion that Internet backbone markets were concentrated and
that the dominant Internet backbones would discriminate against their
smaller competitors (MCI/Worldcom); to the assertion that cable
companies would gain the ability and incentive to restrict their subscribers'
access to the content and services of unaffiliated companies (AT&T/TCI,
AT&T/MediaOne, AOL/Time Warner); to the assertion that those entities
controlling Internet transmission facilities should be required to sell raw
1. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996:
Intercarrier Competition for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report and Order,
FCC No. 01-13 1, par. 19 (Apr. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Local Competition Provisions, Order
on Remand and Report and Order].
2. E.g., William E. Kennard, The Unregulation of the Internet: Laying a Competitive
Course for the Future, Remarks Before the Federal Communications Bar Northern
California Chapter available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek924.html (July
20, 1999).
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transmission capacity to permit unaffiliated companies to market
competing services directly to consumers (including the cable mergers and
Baby Bell mergers as well). In one fashion or another, opponents of the
mergers argued that the essential nature of the Intemet--open, democratic,
and fiercely competitive-was threatened by the mergers.
Although, on the surface, the government seemed unpersuaded and
the dominant rhetoric of "no regulation for the Internet" continued, in each
of these mergers, the antitrust authorities or the FCC permitted the merger
only after the companies agreed to specific conditions designed to address
the competitive structure of the Internet. In the MCI/Worldcom merger, the
government required the divestiture of MCI's Internet backbone. In the
various Bell Company mergers, the government required specific steps to
open the local loop for greater competition among DSL providers. In the
AOL/Time Warner merger, the government required the merged company
to develop new wholesale transport arrangements favoring unaffiliated
Internet service providers. What seems to be missing is a generalized
approach to Internet interconnection problems. Some of the specific merger
conditions seem right, and some seem wrong or irrelevant to the
competitive issues raised by the mergers. But all of them were imposed
only on specific players in a market and were based on reasoning specific
to a single (albeit important) transaction in that market. Moreover, many
interconnection disputes arise in contexts other than mergers.
This Article argues that some generalized interconnection rules are
broadly appropriate. Specifically, this Article suggests that some lessons
learned from the ancient regime of common carrier regulation provide the
appropriate regulatory foundation for the modem Internet. Since at least the
middle ages, most significant carriers of communications and commerce
have been regulated as common carriers. Common carrier rules have
resolved the disputed issues of duty to serve, nondiscrimination, and
interconnection. These were the problems of seventeenth-century ferry
owners and innkeepers, eighteenth-century steamships, nineteenth-century
railroads, and twentieth-century telephone networks. They are similar to the
problems of the twenty-first-century Internet, and similar rules can govern
its evolution as well.
This is not to say, of course, that the rules of innkeepers, railroads, or
telephones should be imported wholesale to govern the Internet. Rather, the
history of common carrier regulation demonstrates the fundamental
importance of interconnection rules for transportation and communications
networks. Interconnection had a common law analog in the duty of
common carriers to serve the public generally, and explicit interconnection
requirements, when later imposed by statute, helped create extensive
Number 2]
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transportation and communications networks. These networks were
extraordinarily useful in their own right, but they also permitted the
development of new markets that used their services as inputs.
Thus, this Article argues for a general interconnection obligation for
Internet carriers. The legal history lessons sketched out above do not stand
alone, however. The Article also reviews the technical scheme of the
Internet, and the economics of networks generally. Both the technical side
of the Internet and the economics of it as a network similarly demonstrate
the value of a general interconnection obligation for a bearer network such
as the Internet. The technical and economics reviews also help identify
precisely how the interconnection obligation should be defined.
The plan of the Article is as follows: Part II describes several current
Internet interconnection disputes as case studies for the general Internet
interconnection problem. These case studies-peering, cable open access,
instant messaging, and reciprocal compensation for Internet-bound
telephone calls-are interesting interconnection disputes in their own right.
But they also demonstrate the various layers, from the core to the periphery
of the Internet, at which Internet interconnection disputes occur. Part III
describes the current technical, legal, and economic dimensions of Internet
interconnection. At a technical level, the Internet is designed for the very
purpose of interconnecting networks, but no legal rules require pure
Internet carriers to interconnect with one another. Interconnection results,
or is resisted, based upon the economic costs and benefits of
interconnecting.
Part IV provides a relevant history of common carrier regulation,
from the common law to twentieth-century regulation of many parts of the
economy. The duties now associated with common carrier regulation
originally applied both to carriers (such as ferrymen, coaches, and
railroads) and to noncarriers (such as innkeepers, farriers, and other skilled
tradesmen). Later statutory enactments focused common carrier duties on
carriers alone. An examination of the common law and leading common
carrier statutes demonstrates that common carrier duties were imposed to
combat monopolies or to address other public interests. Moreover, the
inquiry demonstrates that specific interconnection obligations, and duties to
establish joint services, evolved from the original duty to serve (and the
duty of nondiscrimination).
Part V addresses the Internet interconnection disputes in the language
of the law of common callings. Internet carriers generally undertake to
serve all, and the Internet's construction and operation were advanced
through direct and indirect government benefit. Moreover, Internet markets
may exhibit at least localized monopoly, and they certainly exhibit strong
[Vol. 54
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network effects. For these reasons, Internet carriers fit well within the
tradition of common carriers. Part V therefore proposes a tempered
interconnection duty, which addresses competitive concerns without
requiring mandatory unbundling and its inevitable complementary pricing
regulation. This proposed approach would require interconnection between
backbones and other Internet carriers and between both Internet and
telephone carriers. It would also require interoperability at the core of
instant messaging technology. It would not, however, require the
fundamental unbundling associated with cable open access demands. The
interconnection requirement proposed here ensures that the Internet
remains a single network, while limiting the threat that heavy-handed
regulation would pose to the Internet's vibrancy.
II. A SAMPLER OF INTERNET INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES
Many of the most significant clashes among Internet carriers and
businesses are actually conflicts over interconnection--either over the
threshold question of whether interconnection will be allowed or over the
terms and conditions of interconnection. This Part assembles a sampler of
those interconnection disputes. In particular, it describes (a) the concerns
over peering and transit arrangements, through which Internet backbones
and smaller ISPs interconnect; (b) open access disputes concerning ISP
access to high speed Internet access services offered by cable companies;
(c) instant messaging disputes, centering around the market leader AOL's
refusal to make its instant messaging system interoperate with other
systems; and (d) reciprocal compensation disputes surrounding Internet-
bound telephone calls. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather
a collection of some of the more publicized interconnection disputes which
can serve as general examples of the need for an Internet interconnection
policy. 3 Additionally, as to these selected disputes, the FCC has engaged in
at least preliminary consideration. In general, the FCC has not adopted
specific rules requiring interconnection or otherwise regulating on a
comprehensive basis.
3. Other disputes that might be characterized as Internet interconnection problems, and
which could be addressed using the same general framework developed in this Article,
include the dispute over "triggers" being made available for interactive television service,
see generally Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Serv. Over
Cable, Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R 1321 (2001); the disputes over unbundling telephone
local loops for DSL carriers, see generally Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications
Nenvorks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999); or even the dispute over alleged preferential treatment
by search engines of certain Web sites, see Jon Muehlbauer, Fess Up, Search Engines, THE
INDusTRY STANDARD (July 17, 2001), available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/
0,1902,27975,00.html.
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A. Peering
By contrast to the voice telecommunications network, which has
fairly regularized interconnection practices, the Internet's practices are
unsettled. The telecommunications network interconnects under the well-
established Integrated Services Digital Network ("ISDN") and Signalling
System 7 standards.4 The economic aspects of connections between voice
telecommunications providers are similarly well-settled. The "access
charge" system of payments governs compensation from long-distance
carriers to local carriers when they must interconnect for the completion of
a long-distance telephone call. 5 "Reciprocal compensation" rules govern
the completion and termination of calls between local carriers, and
unbundled network element charges govern the compensation one carrier
• 6
receives for an element used by another carrier. Admittedly, there are gaps
in these rules, largely arising where the traditional phone network
interconnects with the Internet (which will be discussed later),7 but the
fundamental rules are established and understood.
By contrast, the economic rules for interconnection of Internet
transport providers are not well-settled. In fact, they are not regulated at all.
The FCC has refused to apply the Communications Act of 1934 (the 1934
Act) to Internet transport." The National Science Foundation ("NSF')
exited the Internet in 1995,9 and the primacy of the NSF-established public
peering points has faded as those points have become backlogged. Indeed,
with the privatization of the domain-name system, government has almost
completely exited the Internet. 0
4. See generally MARTIN P. CLARK, NETwORKS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS: DESIGN
AND OPERATION 249-66 (2d ed. 1997).
5. See generally Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982,
15990-94, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209, 1220-23 (1997), aff'd Southwestern Bell Tel. v.
FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998), subsequent history omitted [hereinafter Access Charge
Reform].
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (Supp. V 1999); Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996: Interconnection Between Local
Exch. Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Providers, First Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 15499, paras. 1033-1034, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996), subsequent history
omitted [hereinafter Telecomm. Act of 1996, First Report and Order].
7. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of
1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 201 (1999), vacated by
Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Local Competition
Provisions, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
8. See JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET 15 (F.C.C.
Working Paper No. 31, 1999).
9. Id. at 59-60.
10. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You - Fool Us Twice
[Vol. 54
INTERNET INTERCONNECTION
Privately negotiated interconnection has become the dominant form
of interconnection for Internet transport." In 1997, UUNet (then the largest
backbone) announced that it would end open-peering, and other backbones
followed suit.12 This private interconnection comes in two flavors: (1)
peering, under which the few Tier-i backbone providers interconnect and
exchange traffic on a bill-and-keep basis, and (2) transit arrangements,
under which smaller ISPs purchase interconnection with a Tier-i
backbone.
13
Complaints of excessive pricing and discrimination have inevitably
followed the backbone providers' decisions to charge smaller ISPs for
connectivity. The backbones are vertically integrated-that is, they
compete with smaller ISPs for retail customers (both individual and
business subscribers and content providers). 4 Smaller ISPs perceive that
the backbones are attempting to stifle competition (or at least disadvantage
them as competitors) by limiting peering to a favored club and by charging
excessive prices for the necessary connection to a national backbone. 5
Concern over concentration in the Internet backbone market was one of the
leading reasons that the U.S. Department of Justice and the European
Union announced that they would challenge the proposed Worldcom/Sprint
16
merger.
Moreover, most commentators agree that even the current peering
arrangements are under substantial pressure. Part of this pressure arises
from the need for all Internet and telecommunications carriers to now show
a current profit, which will cause Internet backbone carriers to vigorously
Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone
Network and Domain Name Systems, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89 (2001) (providing a recent,
excellent discussion of the government's role in fostering and controlling, but later exiting,
the Internet).
11. See, e.g., Brian Quinton, NAP Time's Over, TELEPHONY, May 31, 1999, at 52;
Nancy Weil, Owning the Net, INFOWoRLD, Mar. 20, 2000, at 36.
12. See Bernadette Jew, New Issues for Internet Interconnection,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 2000, at 67.
13. E.g., id.; OXMAN, supra note 8, at 56.
14. OxMAN, supra note 8, at 56-57; Stanley Besen et al., Advances in Routing
Technologies andInternet Peering Agreements, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 292,292 (2001).
15. See, e.g., Denise Pappalardo, When Private Peering Arrangements Go Bad,
NETWORK WORLD, June 11, 2001, at 8; Kesan & Shah, supra note 10, at 196-98; Jew, supra
note 12, at 67-68; Neil Weinberg, Backbone Bullies, FoRBFs, June 12, 2000, at 236;
Jonathan Angel, Toll Lanes on the Information Superhighway, NErWORK, Feb. 1, 2000, at
27.
16. Seth Scheisel & David Leonhardt, Justice Dept. Moves to Block Merger of Two
Phone Giants, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 2000, at Al; Complaint, United States v. Worldcom,
Inc., available at http:/www.usdoj.govlatr/cases/f7000/7043.htm (Nov. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter WorldCom Complaint] (identifying Internet backbone services as a relevant
market in which the merger would have anticompetitive effects).
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enforce their peering policies.17 In one concrete example, Tier-1 backbone
Cable & Wireless cut off backbone PSINet and fourteen other ISPs for
failure to maintain minimum traffic volumes required by their peering
policies, the result being that some customers lost interconnection for
several days. 8 Another part of this pressure arises from the backbones'
attempts to differentiate themselves by offering quality-of-service
guarantees. Transit between networks is one of the most significant causes
of delay and lost data, and backbones are therefore pushing on-network
service arrangements. The focus on such on-network quality, however, may
diminish the networks' incentives to peer at high quality because inefficient
interconnection may attract more subscribers to their own networks.' 9
The FCC's Office of Plans and Policy has recently issued a working
paper in which it defends the FCC's decision not to require Internet
backbones to provide interconnection and not to regulate (or even
•20
investigate) the backbone's peering and pricing requirements. It concludes
that there is no need for regulation of peering or transit arrangements. The
paper concedes that a dominant Internet backbone might engage in various
anticompetitive activities, including charging excessive prices for
interconnection, engaging in a price squeeze, or discriminating in theS 21
quality of interconnection against competitors. The paper concludes,
however, that five nationwide Internet backbones currently compete against
each other 22 and that, absent a merger or significant technological advance
23for only one of the backbones, no dominant backbone is likely to emerge.
Moreover, the paper argues that the backbones' continued reluctance to
peer with new entrants into the market is no cause for concern because the
backbones do compete with each other for transit arrangements. As a result,
the theory goes, the backbones cannot charge supracompetitive prices for
24interconnection. This working paper does not represent the official
position of the FCC, but as described below, the FCC has in several
17. See, e.g., Lenny Liebman, Peer Pressure, COMMUNICATIONS NEWS, June 1, 2001, at
92; Lenny Liebman, The Other Peer-to-Peer, ISPs Are Likely to Rethink Traffic Exchange
as Profit Pressures Grow, NETWORK MAGAZINE, July 1, 2001, at 84.
18. See Pappalardo, supra note 15, at 8; Eric Krapf, Straightening Out the Internet
Backbone, Bus. COMM. REV., July 1, 2001, at 14.
19. See, e.g., Jade Boyd, Cross-Carrier SLAs Still a Distant Goal, INTERNETWEEK, July
9, 2001, at 11; John C. Tanner, Peering into the Future, AMERICA'S NETWORK, May 15,
2001, at 69; Kesan & Shah, supra note 10, at 151-54.
20. MICHAEL KENDE, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING INTERNET BACKBONES
(F.C.C. Working Paper No. 32,2000).
21. Id. at 22-23.
22. Id. at 7, 24, 39.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id. at 20.
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different orders written that Internet backbones are not telecommunications
carriers and therefore are not subject to the mandatory interconnection
requirements of the 1934 Act.25
By contrast to the FCC's optimistic conclusions, several economists
have developed models that suggest that, under certain conditions, there are
genuine competitive concerns in backbone markets. For example, some
economic modeling has demonstrated that a larger backbone may have the
ability and incentive to degrade connections to its rivals, thus injuring
overall competition in the backbone market.2' Although, as the FCC notes,
there are five Tier-i backbones, Worldcom's backbone still had twenty-
nine percent of the market, far ahead of number-two backbone Sprint's
fifteen percent. On the other hand, some economists have argued that
multihoming and lower-tier peering (i.e., peering among non-Tier-1 ISPs)
can mitigate the ability of Tier-i backbones to behave anticompetitively.28
There are limits, however, to the degree to which the Internet's protocol
can tolerate multihoming and low-level peering, and the proliferation of
those practices could degrade Internet performance substantially. 29 Given
the recent collapse of telecommunications stocks, a further concentration of
Internet backbones is expected.3
In sum, there continue to be disputes over the fairness and
completeness of Internet backbone providers' willingness to interconnect
and the fairness of their interconnection policies. The FCC's current
position is that the market is competitive and needs no regulation, while the
economic work is indeterminate on the question. The stakes, however, are
significant, given the amount of activity that depends upon the Internet. If a
few providers are able to behave anticompetitively, then both commercial
and noncommercial users of the Internet will suffer by paying a higher
price for the universal interconnection that makes the Internet valuable.
B. Open Access
Moving from the core to the periphery of the Internet, the past three
years have also seen a battle over so-called "open access" rules for high-
speed Internet access providers-typically cable modem providers. The
25. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
26. See generally Jacques Cremer et al., Connectivity in the Commercial Internet, 48 J.
INDUS. ECON. 433 (2000).
27. See Krapf, supra note 18, at 14.
28. See Besen et al., supra note 14, at 294-96.
29. See Sandra Borthwick, Today's Internet Can't Scale, Bus. COMM. REV., May 2001,
at 28.
30. See Krapf, supra note 18, at 14.
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issue first arose with the AT&T/TCI merger, and has gained steam with
subsequent mergers (AT&T/MediaOne and AOL/Time Warner) and with
the continued and expanding lead that cable modem service has over its
main high-speed competitor, DSL service, at least in residential markets.3'
The FCC rejected calls for open access conditions in the AT&T/TCI and
AT&T/MediaOne merger decisions, but both the FTC and the FCC
imposed open access rules on the AOL/Time Warner merger.
The dispute over such rules arose because cable providers generally
offered Internet access only through a particular ISP such as Excite@Home
or Roadrunner. Although consumers could reach other ISPs and could even
configure their systems to avoid having the affiliated ISP as their "first
screen," consumers could not purchase high-speed Internet access from
other ISPs. In addition, those other ISPs have no direct role in the
engineering or performance of the cable system's service.32 This
"exclusive" arrangement led to fears that cable providers would
discriminate against unaffiliated ISPs and content providers by degrading
access, charging higher prices, or blocking certain content--especially
next-generation content such as streaming video that cable operators mightS33
find competes with their traditional video programming. Two respected
commentators have gone so far as to claim that the failure to require
general open access rules puts at risk the entire "architecture of the
Internet.
'34
The regulatory response to these arguments has been uneven to say
the least. The FCC refused to impose open access conditions in the
AT&T/TCI and AT&T/MediaOne merger proceedings.3 ' Several
31. See generally James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A
Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000)
[hereinafter Critique of Open Access Rules]; James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of
Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLo. L. REV. 975 (2000) [hereinafter Vertical Dimension];
Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic
Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLo. L. REv. 1011 (2000); Phil
Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 COLo. L. REv. 819, 832-
37 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925 (2001). The First
Amendment dimensions of cable open access, which are largely beyond the scope of this
paper, are comprehensively discussed in Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and
the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REv. 281 (2000), and Harold Feld, Whose Line is it
Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23
(2000).
32. Vertical Dimension, supra note 31, at 979.
33. See generally Cooper, supra note 31; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 31.
34. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 31, at 944.
35. See App'n of AT&T Corp. and Tele-Communications, Inc. for Transfer of Control
of Tele-Communications, Inc. to AT&T Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 3160, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999); App'n For Consent to the Transfer of
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municipalities attempted to impose such conditions, but each attempt was1 6
invalidated in subsequent court proceedings. In the AOL/Time Warner
merger, the FT7C imposed conditions on the merger that required a minimal
37level of open access for other ISPs to a high-speed Internet access service,
and the FCC followed suit.38 These conditions essentially required
AOL/Time Warner to permit Earthlink and two other ISPs to sell high-
speed Internet service over any cable system on which AOL/Time Warner
sold high-speed AOL Internet access service.39 The FTC and FCC refused
to apply a general open access condition in favor of all unaffiliated ISPs,
and the open access condition that was imposed applies only if the merged
company offers AOL service on the cable systems instead of the existing
40Roadrunner service. In the meantime, AT&T has been holding open
access trials after announcing a commitment to implement open access in
2002.41 Also, the FCC has announced a Notice of Inquiry into cable open
access rules on an industry-wide basis, although it has yet to reach any
conclusions.42
C. Instant Messaging
Instant messaging is a now very familiar service that permits real-
time, text-based conversation between two or more people. According to
some estimates, more than 200 million people now subscribe to instant
messaging; the undisputed market leader is AOL, with over 150 million of
Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc.,
Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.1.
9816, para. 5 (2000).
36. See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that federal law forbade municipality from imposing open access conditions);
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that cable Internet
services are "telecommunications" and, therefore, municipalities may not order cable
companies to provide those services); Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v.
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that county open access
condition violated First Amendment).
37. See AOL Corp. & Time Warner, Inc., Decision and Order (Dec. 14, 2000) at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf.
38. See App'n for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner, Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547,23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 157 (2000) [hereinafter
AOLTW Merger Order].
39. See id. para. 126.
40. See id. para. 127 & n.363.
41. Kara Swisher et al., AT&T's Access Plan Draws a Mixed Reaction, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 7, 1999, at B6.
42. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facil., Notice oflnquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19287 (2000) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry].
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those subscribers. Currently, AOL's instant messaging system is not
interconnected with any other system; that is, one must be an AOL instant
messaging subscriber in order to communicate with other AOL instant
messaging subscribers." In the proceedings over the AOLTime Warner
merger, several parties argued that the FTC and the FCC should condition
the merger on the requirement that AOL permit interconnection or
interoperability between its instant messaging service and the instant
messaging services of other companies.45 On the one hand, the FTC and the
FCC refused to do that; on the other hand, the FCC made a condition of the
merger that AOL ensure interoperability at the time it introduces so-called
"advanced instant messaging service" (i.e., instant messaging employing
streaming multimedia).46
All instant messaging programs rely on a names and presence
database ("NPD") as the core of the service. The NPD lists all of the
subscribers and keeps track of each subscriber's "buddies"--those other
subscribers that a given subscriber may wish to communicate with.47 When
a subscriber signs on to the instant messaging service, the NPD records the
subscriber's current Internet Protocol address.48 The "IP address" is the
actual Internet "address" of the subscriber's computer. The NPD is
necessary because most ISPs and corporate networks assign IP addresses
on a dynamic basis.4 9 That is, they own a total number of IP addresses
smaller than their total number of subscribers, and not all subscribers are
logged on at the same time. So, they assign an IP address to a subscriber
each time the subscriber logs on to the Internet. As a result, instant
messaging could not work without the NPD, because an instant messaging
subscriber could have a different IP address each time he or she signed on
to the service. The NPD solves this problem by keeping track of each
subscriber's real-time IP address. 0
43. See, e.g., Joe Wilcox, MSN Fails to Deliver, CNET NEWS.COM (July 5, 2001) at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-6464354.html; Nick Wingfield, Changing Chat,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2000, at R28.
44. See AOI/W Merger Order, supra note 38, para. 164.
45. See id. paras. 143-47.
46. Id. para. 190.
47. Id. paras. 138-39.
48. M. Day et al., Instant Messaging/Presence Protocol Requirements, INTERNET
SOcIETY, Request for Comment 2779, 5, at http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/cgi-bin/rfc/
rfc2779.txt (2000).
49. REGIS J. BATES, BROADBAND TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 516-17 (2000);
RAYMOND GREENLAW & ELLEN HEPP, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNET FOR ENGINEERS 103
(1999).
50. Jeff Tyson, How Instant Messaging Works, at http:llwww.howstuffworks.com/
instant-messaging.htm/printable (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
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Apart from the NPD, instant messaging services diverge with respect
to use of a centralized system or a peer-to-peer system. A centralized
instant messaging service routes all of the messages between subscribers
through centralized services."' In a peer-to-peer service, the NPD provides
each subscriber's computer with the IP addresses of the other subscribers
he or she wishes to communicate with, and the messages are sent directly
from machine to machine. 52 Of course, an instant messaging system may
use a combination of the two systems, as AOL's apparently does by using a
centralized protocol for text messages and peer-to-peer for audio or video
53
components.
In the AOL/Time Warner merger, parties argued that AOL's refusal
to create an interoperable instant messaging service was impeding
competition in that market.54 Indeed, an instant messaging subscriber will
want to subscribe to the service that the people it wishes to communicate
with are most likely to subscribe to, and hence, the company with the
largest subscriber base has a substantial advantage. AOL argued that
interoperability-which in this context is really just an interconnected NPD
system-was technically difficult and could compromise the privacy and
security of its subscribers.55
The FCC ruled that the merger would not be conditioned on terms
requiring the interoperability of instant messaging systems, although it did
impose conditions requiring interoperability of future, multimedia, instant
messaging services. As Phil Weiser has succinctly put it, however, "[i]n
terms of setting a precedent for future regulation of information platforms,
the FCC's AOL/Time Warner Order failed to set forth a principled model
of analysis. ' 56 As to current instant messaging, the FCC simply ruled that
whatever advantage or anticompetitive activity surrounded AOL's instant
messaging, the merger did not affect it. Because Time Warner had no
instant messaging service, the merger did not increase concentration in
instant messaging or otherwise enhance AOL's ability to behave
• • • 57
anticompetitively. By contrast, the FCC held that the merger would affect
AOL's ability to deploy so-called "advanced instant messaging"--instant
messaging that deployed multimedia capabilities for real-time video
51. Michael Gowan, How it Works: Instant Messaging, May 25, 2000, at
http:lwww.cnn.com/2000/TECHIcomputing/O5/25/how.messaging.works.idg.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. AOL/JTWMerger Order, supra note 38, paras. 168-69.
55. Id. para. 170.
56. Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N.
KY. L. REv. 822, 844 (2001).
57. AOL/TWMerger Order, supra note 38, para. 188.
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streaming. Time Warner was the second largest cable system in the country
and one of the leaders in the deployment of high-speed cable data services
such as broadband Internet access. As a result, the merger would affect
AOL's advantage in advanced instant messaging." Thus, the FCC
conditioned the merger on AOL's agreeing to deploy an interoperable
advanced instant messaging service if and when it deployed such service. 9
The stakes in the instant messaging interconnection debate are
significant, especially if instant messaging becomes a substitute for other
types of communications such as telephone calls. In its original form as
exclusively a text-based chat service, instant messaging was unique in that
it indirectly substituted for some telephone calls. But even today, instant
messaging permits two users to have voice conversations and to exchange
messages that include pictures or music. 61 The fear (of those other than
AOL) is that instant messaging will become a communications platform for
all of these services-text chat, voice calls, and even "picture phone." In
such a circumstance, AOL's control over the most important NPD could
give it significant control over the communications network (and the
62Internet). At a minimum, as the FCC concluded, having multiple NPDs-
which would be required if systems did not interconnect-and requiring
consumers to have multiple instant messaging clients on their computers,
would be inefficient.63
D. Reciprocal Compensation
The last interconnection dispute for discussion here is the debate over
reciprocal compensation payments among local exchange carriers
("LECs") for the delivery of so-called Intemet-bound calls. This dispute is
somewhat different from the others discussed in this Part, for there is
indisputably a legal interconnection requirement. The dispute centers
around the compensation due between carriers that interconnect for the
transport and termination of traffic exchanged. Potentially billions of
dollars are at issue, but because the courts have recently vacated the FCC's
rules in this area, there is no current resolution of whether or how much
compensation should be paid.
"Reciprocal compensation" refers to the payments that are made
58. Id. paras. 176-79.
59. Id. paras. 189-90.
60. See also Weiser, supra note 56, at 843.
61. AOL/TW Merger Order, supra note 38, para. 187.
62. Id. paras. 160, 185.
63. Id. paras. 154-56.
64. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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between local telephone companies (local exchange carriers in the
Communications Act's parlance) for calls initiated on one network and
terminated on another interconnected company's network. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act) requires all local
exchange companies to interconnect,65 and requires interconnecting LECs
"to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and
termination of telecommunications." 66 The 1996 Act requires that these
compensation arrangements provide for the recovery of "costs associated
with the transport and termination on each carrier's network facilities of
calls that originate on the network facilities of the other carrier ... ,67 But
the Act also expressly permits a "bill-and-keep" arrangement, whereby
neither interconnected carrier pays the other for the termination of specific
calls.
68
Instead of negotiating bill-and-keep arrangements, most incumbent
local exchange carriers ("ILECs") entered into reciprocal compensation
arrangements with new carriers (the competitive local exchange carriers or
"CLECs") that required the actual payment of money for the completion of
each call-usually a fraction of a cent per minute.69 It is not clear why the
ILECs pushed for reciprocal compensation instead of bill-and-keep
arrangements. 70 But the result, as even the FCC has found, was a classic
case of "regulatory arbitrage.' 7' Some CLECs decided to focus on serving
65. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
66. Id. § 251(b)(5) (Supp. V 1999).
67. Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1999).
68. Id. § 252(d)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1999).
69. See Local Competition Provision, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 3689-93; Thomas W. Bonnett, Is ISP-Bound Traffic Local or
Interstate?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 239, 269-71 (2001); Kasey A. Chappelle, The End of the
Beginning: Theories and Practical Aspects of Reciprocal Compensation for Internet Traffic,
7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 393, 397-98 (1999).
70. It is sometimes speculated that the ILECs miscalculated that their larger networks
would deliver more traffic to the CLEC's newer and smaller networks than returned in the
other direction. See Bonnett, supra note 69, at 270; Chappelle, supra note 69, at 398. This is
simply bad traffic engineering, for there is no reason that, on average, traffic flows between
two networks should be equal even if the networks are radically different in size. CLARK,
supra note 4, at 539-40. However, the ILECs may have been misled by their experience
with cellular networks, which generate a much larger outflow of calls to the landline
network than inflow to the cellular network. Owners of wireless phones do not give out or
encourage incoming calls to the same degree that they make outgoing calls. Perhaps the
ILECs expected their experience with the new CLECs would be the same and therefore
pushed for reciprocal compensation. Or perhaps ILECs thought CLECs would focus on
business customers that make more outgoing than incoming local calls. Bonnett, supra note
69, at 270-71.
71. See Local Competition Provisions, Order on Remand and Report and Order, supra
note 1, para. 2. ("The regulatory arbitrage opportunities associated with intercarrier
payments are particularly apparent with respect to ISP-bound traffic, however, because ISPs
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customers that generated large numbers of incoming calls and few outgoing
calls, so that the net reciprocal compensation flow would be positive to
them. The biggest example of such customers are ISPs, who generate
almost no outgoing calls.72 After a short period of time, ILECs recognized
that they were paying substantial sums to CLECs for ISP-bound calls, and
they sought relief from the state public utility commissions that supervised
the interconnection agreements73 and from the FCC.74 The ILECs argued
that ISP-bound calls were not "local calls" and therefore were not subject
to the reciprocal compensation requirement, which the FCC had previously
held only applied to "local" calls.75 The iLECs also argued that, if they
were local calls, ISP-bound calls were not "telecommunications" and were
76not subject to the reciprocal compensation requirement.
The large reciprocal compensation payments to CLECs for ISP-bound
calls were particularly difficult for the ILECs to tolerate, because they were
in such sharp contrast to the regulatory regime that had governed calls the
ILECs would deliver directly to ISPs. As noted above, ISPs usually
interconnected with the local carriers as customers; they paid for business
lines or trunk group access. The ILECs had, in fact, long sought to have
them pay more-to pay the same "access charges" that long-distance
carriers paid for the origination and termination of long-distance calls. "The
business line rates are significantly lower than the equivalent interstate
access charges, given the ISPs' high volumes of usage. '77 The FCC has
repeatedly rejected that argument, holding that the exemption from access
charges helped the growth of information services and the Internet, in part
because access charges include non-cost elements intended to subsidize
local service.78
typically generate large volumes of traffic that is virtually all one-way-that is, delivered to
the ISP.").
72. See id.; see also Bonnett, supra note 69, at 270-73; Chappelle, supra note 69, at
398.
73. Under the 1996 Act, disputes over interconnection agreements are first adjudicated
by state public utility commissions and then reviewed by federal district courts. See Philip J.
Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 1, 5-10 (1999).
74. See Local Competition Provisions, Order on Remand and Report and Order, supra
note 1, paras. 9-18 (describing history of ILEC petitions).
75. See Telecomm. Act of 1996, First Report and Order, supra note 6, para. 1034
(section 251(b)(5) reciprocal compensation requirements "apply only to traffic that
originates and terminates within a local area"), affid in part and vacated in part,
Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997).
76. See Bonnett, supra note 69, at 274-75; Chappelle, supra note 69, at 399.
77. Access Charge Reform, supra note 5, para. 342.
78. Id. paras. 344-47; see also MTS & WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, paras. 75-90, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 615 (1983) (FCC's
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In the early rounds, the FCC essentially rejected the ILECs'
arguments and ordered that reciprocal compensation is owed on ISP-bound
traffic. The FCC first held that ISP-bound calls were interstate in nature,
because a typical Internet connection would involve the user accessing
Web sites in many different locations and usually across state lines.79 The
FCC nevertheless held that it had not regulated the payment of reciprocal
compensation for such calls, and the inclusion of such calls in
interconnection agreements was proper (if state commissions so ruled).80
The FCC then initiated a rulemaking proceeding in which it again held that
the calls were interstate calls (and thus retained its jurisdiction over the
calls) and that the calls were subject to the reciprocal compensation
requirement, until such time as new interconnection agreements were
negotiated and approved by the state commissions."'
The D.C. Circuit reversed this ruling, finding unpersuasive the FCC's
holding that the calls were "interstate. '8 2 The court held that the FCC
should reconsider whether a caller's Internet session should actually be
included in determining whether the call was interstate. Rather, the court
wrote, because section 251(b)(1) requires reciprocal compensation to be
paid for the termination of "telecommunications," the FCC needed to
explain why the only "telecommunications" was not the local call dialed by
the Internet user to his or her local ISP access number.83 Viewed in this
manner, it looks like a local call-notwithstanding that the ISP may itself
be using interstate communications to enable Web surfing.
84
The FCC recently issued an order affirming its prior results and
attempting to remedy the deficiencies that the D.C. Circuit found in its
reasoning.85 The FCC reaffirmed that reciprocal compensation was not due
to CLECs on ISP-bound calls under section 251(b). But the FCC altered its
reasons for so holding. Instead of holding that ISP-bound calls were not
"local calls" and therefore were outside of 251(b), the Commission
concluded that a separate section of the Act-section 251 (g)-exempted all
original order exempting all information service providers from payment of access charges;
prior to AT&T break up, there was no formal access charge system).
79. Local Competition Provisions, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 3695-701.
80. Id. at 3703-06.
81. Id. at 3707-09.
82. Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 5, 8.
84. Id. at 6-8.
85. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996;
Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report and Order,
16 F.C.C.R. 9151, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 678 (2001) [hereinafter Telecomm. Act of 1996,
Order on Remand and Report and Order].
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exchange access and information access services from the reciprocalS 86
compensation requirement. ISP-bound calls were information access
87
services. The agency then held that, as an information access service, ISP-
bound calls were an interstate information access service, because the
intrastate and interstate portions of the calls could not be separated."' As a
result, the FCC asserted its jurisdiction under section 201(b) to require
interconnection between ILECs and CLECs for this interstate information
access service. s Although the FCC reaffirmed that it was up to state utility
commissions to determine retrospectively whether reciprocal compensation
payments were owed based on interconnection agreements, the FCC now
asserted its section 201(b) authority to require payments-although at
much lower per-minute rates and at rates that would decrease over time.9
The FCC also asserted that it intended to move to a bill-and-keep regime
for such interconnection,9' and it released on the same day a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking that proposed to mandate that all intercarrier
interconnection be set on a bill-and-keep basis.92
Although this dispute has centered on the question of pricing for
interconnection, and not on the prior issue of whether interconnection is
mandatory, it highlights several important dimensions for Internet
interconnection controversies. First, it identifies the possibility that
interconnection can be achieved in a manner other than by a carrier-to-
carrier interconnection requirement, as it was achieved by ordering that
information service providers (including Internet carriers) have the right to
interconnect with a network as a customer. Second, it provides an example
of an interconnection regime that created an opportunity for profits based
solely on the regulation, a result that should be avoided if regulation is
intended to both simulate and stimulate competition. And, third, it of
course provides a reminder that a mandatory interconnection regime will
often need to be backed up by pricing rules--even if those pricing rules
mandate that no money changes hands, as in bill-and-keep.
86. Id. paras. 31-41. Hence, the FCC reversed its position that section 251(b)(5)
requires reciprocal compensation only for "local calls." Instead, the FCC held that section
251(b)(5) requires reciprocal compensation for all interconnection arrangements, except
where section 25 l(g) governs.
87. Id. paras. 42-47.
88. Id. paras. 52-55.
89. Id. paras. 52-65.
90. See id. para. 66.
91. Telecomm. Act of 1996, Order on Renand and Report and Order, supra note 85,
paras. 67-76.
92. Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610 (2001).
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III. PHASES OF INTERNET INTERCONNECTION
The Internet both depends upon and is defined by interconnection. In
significant part, the Internet's interconnectedness arises from definitional
circularity: those providing information and services "on the Internet" and
those purchasing access "to the Internet" share an expectation of mutual,
universal interconnection. That is, everyone using the Internet has an
expectation that he or she will be able to reach everyone else using the
Internet. As background for developing appropriate legal rules to govern an
Internet interconnection regime, this Part describes the technical and
economic aspects of Internet interconnection. It also describes the current
legal regime governing Internet interconnection. It is only slight hyperbole
to say that the entire Internet project was about developing the appropriate
protocols for interconnecting computers and computer networks. And it is
no exaggeration at all to say that the Internet is particularly valuable
because these Internet protocols successfully integrate a staggering number
of computers and networks. Currently, the Internet interconnection regime
largely succeeds despite the absence of legal rules requiring
interconnection, although a significant body of law requires the
interconnection between Internet carriers and other types of carriers.
A. Technical Interconnection
As is well known, today's Internet had its origins in the academic and
defense project known as the ARPANET, a project of the U.S. Department
of Defense Advance Research Projects Agency ("ARPA").93 In the 1960s,
ARPA was funding a variety of computer research projects at universities
throughout the country. The initial ARPA interconnection project was an
attempt to develop a network that would interconnect these various
computers so that all ARPA researchers and administrators could share the
resources, thereby decreasing the need for duplication of expensive
computing facilities.94 By 1969, ARPANET came into existence, linking
together four different research centers,95 and by 1971, the network
infrastructure to connect ARPA's fifteen major computing centers was in
place.1
6
93. See, e.g., Peggy M. Karp, Origin, Development and Current Status of the ARPA
Network, in SEvENTH ANNUAL IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE,
DIGEST PAPERS 49-52 (1973); CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVMS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE
INTERNET: A CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT 54-62 (1999); Barry M. Leiner et al., A
Brief History of the Internet 2 at http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history/brief.html (last revised
Aug. 4, 2000).
94. JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 43-47 (1999).
95. Id. at 64; MOSCHOVTIS, supra note 93, at 61-62.
96. ABBATE, supra note 94, at 78; Leiner, supra note 93, at 3.
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
This first phase of the ARPANET connected only different computing
resources, not networks, but it provided much of the theoretical basis and
practical engineering for the next step toward the Internet. For example, the
ARPANET was a packet-switched network, the first large-scale operational
network to employ that technology.97 Similarly, ARPANET relied upon
specific minicomputers dedicated to the task of maintaining the
communications network. This simplified the development of the
communications protocols, because it did not require the programming of
each different kind of computer connected to the network with all of the
communications protocols.9' It also resulted in greater network reliability,
because the network computers could be directed by a single network
operations center.99
The next critical phase, begun in 1973, was the project to devise
protocols to permit the transmission of information across different
networks which themselves were operating with different internal
protocols.' The first successful demonstration of the new inter-networking
protocol is illustrative: in 1977, researchers succeeded in sending messages
from a van in California that was connected to a packet radio network,
through the ARPANET to a satellite network linking the East Coast to
Europe, and back through the ARPANET to a research center in
California.01 Each of these three networks operated on a different internal
protocol, so the inter-networking protocol "wrapped around" the message
to provide information to gateway computers that connected the networks
about how the message should be routed.' 2 A more modem example is the
familiar manner in which inter-networking protocols permit the
interconnection of corporate local area networks, which often run on an
Ethernet-type protocol, with metropolitan area data networks that may run
97. See Leiner, supra note 93, at 2. Packet-switching is the technique of breaking a
communications session into discrete pieces and applying to each packet an addressing
header that allows each packet to be independently routed through the network. It is
distinguished from "circuit switching," in which the network dedicates a certain amount of
transmission capacity to a session between two users and maintains that connection whether
or not the users are actually transmitting information. See generally CLARK, supra note 4, at
11-14. Packet-switched networks can be further distinguished as to whether they are
"connection-oriented" or "connectionless." In the former, the sending computer establishes
contact with the receiving computer and develops a path for the packets to travel through the
network before transmitting. In the latter, the sending computer simply delivers the
addressed packets to the network without first establishing contact or routing. The Internet is
a connectionless network. See id.
98. Leiner, supra note 93, at 2-3; ABBATE, supra note 94, at 31-32.
99. See ABBATE, supra note 94, at 52-53, 60-64.
100. Id. at 122.
101. Id. at 131.
102. Id.
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on a SONET-type protocol, with long-distance Internet backbones, which
often run their protocols over frame relay or ATM switches. As some of the
founders of the Internet have put it:
The Internet as we now know it embodies a key underlying technical
idea, namely that of open architecture networking. In this approach,
the choice of any individual network technology was not dictated by a
particular network architecture but rather could be selected freely by
a provider and made to interwork with the other networks through a
meta-level "Intemetworking Architecture."'' 3
Out of these two major projects eventually emerged the initial
versions of the Transmission Control Protocol ("TCP") and the Internet
Protocol ("IP"), now known together as TCP/IP.'04 TCP provides the
overall "message management" functions that enable computer-to-
computer communication. In simplified form, TCP breaks a computer
message into the appropriate packet sizes, numbers the packets, creates a
check sum so that the receiving computer can check the integrity of the
message, provides the information for the reassembly of the message into
the proper sequence by the receiving computer, and orders the re-sending
of any lost or damaged packet.105 TCP is therefore a protocol used by the
sending and receiving computers to communicate a message.106
The IP is the basis of the interconnection among the networks that
make up the Internet, and it therefore bears somewhat closer examination
here. IP wraps a header around each packet created through the TCP. This
IP header contains the information necessary to route the packets properly
from the sending computer to the receiving computer.17 Thus, the IP
header provides the Internet address of the sending computer and the
Internet address of the destination computer, as well as the other pieces of
information necessary for each network and network gateway to properly
handle the packet.1'0 Whereas TCP provides information necessary for the
receiving computer to handle the message as it arrives in its various
packets, the IP header is the only information that each transit router (itself
103. Leiner, supra note 93, at 3.
104. In the earliest phases of the inter-networking project, there was a single protocol
that both routed messages between computers and networks and provided error-checking
and other message integrity functions. In the late 1970s, the key scientists agreed that the
two protocols should be separately defined. See Leiner, supra note 93, at 4; ABBATE, supra
note 94, at 130.
105. See generally Charles L. Hedrick, Introduction to the Internet Protocols § 2, at
http://oac3.uth.tme.edu/stafffsnewton/tcp-tutorial/ (July 3, 1987).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. For a complete description of the IP header, see CLARK, supra note 4, at 393.
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a computer) in the network must process.109
The decision to separate the TCP from the IP, and to confine the IP to
only the protocols necessary to route packets between computers and
networks, had several important consequences. First, by confining error-
checking and other message-handling functions to the sending and
receiving computers, it simplified the operations of the routing computers
that stand between the various networks and permitted them to handle
messages at greater rates."0 Second, it ensured that routing computers on
the Internet were completely indifferent to the content of the data within
each packet. This meant that the network could permit two computers to
communicate even if the two computers were running a new application
never before seen on the Internet; so long as the two computers packaged
the information they wished to communicate inside an IP packet, the
interconnected networks could transmit the information. In this, the
contrast with the traditional telephone network could not be more stark."'
The traditional telephone network was designed to do only one thing:
transmit voice telephone calls. Of course, as anyone using dial-up Internet
service knows, the telephone network can be made to carry all sorts of
other applications-including all of the Internet applications. But it can do
this only if a device translates the data being transmitted into a form that
the telephone network can carry, namely, audible tones within the range of
the human voice. This is exactly what modems do. By contrast, the Internet
transmits the content of each communications session without requiring the
transformation of the computer's application or session data. This design
feature of the Internet is sometimes referred to as its "end-to-end"
functionality: that application control is remitted to the computers at the
ends of the network and the network transmission and inter-networking
protocols are kept as simple as possible.'
The TCP/IP protocols exist in a well-defined computing and
networking "space." Telecommunications and computer networking
experts have long conceived of networks and their associated computers as
exhibiting a variety of well-defined "layers."" 3 At the bottom of this
109. See Hedrick, supra note 105.
110. ABBATE, supra note 94, at 175.
111. J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments on System Design, in INNOVATIONS IN
INTERNETWORKING 195-206 (Craig Partridge, ed. 1998); Leiner, supra note 93, at 4;
ABBATE, supra note 94, at 171-77.
112. For a policy-oriented summary of the end-to-end argument, see generally Lemley &
Lessig, supra note 31.
113. See generally CLARK, supra note 4, at 194-99 (describing the Open Systems
Interconnection ("OSI") model which defines the layers of traditional telecommunications
networks); THOMAS J. FALLON, THE INTERNET TODAY 31-35 (2001) (describing the different
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"stack" are the physical links between computers. Proceeding "upward"
through the stacks, there next come the protocols necessary to run the links,
the protocols necessary to connect the links together, the protocols
necessary for two computers at the ends of the links to communicate, the
protocols necessary for the two computers to open communications
sessions, the protocols necessary for the computers to associate data with
the appropriate applications, and the protocols necessary for the computer
to execute the application associated with the data.1 4 TCP/IP is an effective
communications protocol for inter-networking because it confines its
standardization to the middle of these layers. Although it forces
standardization on the network connection protocols, it permits substantial
flexibility at lower levels of the protocol stack (permitting various types of
heterogeneous networks to connect) and at the higher levels of the protocol
stack (permitting various types of applications to network
communication).' 1
5
B. Legal Interconnection Requirements
Internet carriers-including Tier-1 backbones, smaller regional
backbones, and ISPs-operate under no legal requirements to interconnect.
Although the FCC almost certainly has the authority under the relevant
statutes to impose such a requirement, it has, to date, refused to do so. The
FCC has generally argued that such an interconnection requirement is
unnecessary and would be contrary to the "unregulated" nature of the
Internet. Nevertheless, a substantial body of law exists that requires
traditional telephone companies to interconnect with Internet carriers, and
it is this body of law that has made the mass-market Internet a success in
the first instance. This Section summarizes existing interconnection
regulation, as well as the debate over extending such regulation to Internet
carriers.
Telecommunications carriers are required to interconnect. Section
201(a) of the 1934 Act made an interconnection requirement contingent
upon a finding by the FCC that "such action [was] necessary or desirable in
the public interest .... ,,6 The 1996 Act made the requirement absolute:
layer descriptions under TCP/IP and.comparing them to the OSI model).
114. This is, admittedly, more of an OSI manner of describing the layers. The number of
described layers are fewer in TCP/IP and its associated protocols. As a conceptual matter,
however, the important feature is to highlight the notion of layering in communications and
computer networks.
115. See David P. Reed et al., in Commentaries on "Active Networking and End-to-End
Arguments," 12 IEEE NETWORK 66, 69-71 (May/June 1998); Lemley & Lessig, supra note
31, at 929-31.
116. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
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"Each telecommunications carrier has the duty... to interconnect directly
or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications
carriers .... Additionally, the 1996 Act included detailed provisions
governing the negotiation of interconnection agreements between
telecommunications carriers and ILECs," 8 and supervision of those
negotiations by the state public utility commissions and the federal
courts." 9
These interconnection requirements do not extend to Internet carriers.
Section 201(a)'s interconnection requirement extends only to "common
carrier[s] engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio,"
and section 251(a)'s interconnection requirement extends only to
"telecommunications carriers" which, under the Act's definitions, are
synonymous with common carriers. 120 The FCC has repeatedly held that all
of the various Internet carriers-from backbone carriers to ISPs--do not
provide common carrier telecommunications service. Rather, drawing on
long-standing Commission precedent, the FCC treats Internet carriers as
providing an "information service.' 2 ' An information service may involve
"telecommunications," but is not itself a telecommunications service
because it also includes the processing of information or the forwarding or
• t, . • 122
retrieval of stored information. Some commentators have persuasively
argued that this distinction no longer makes sense, but the FCC continues
to hew closely to this line as a way of furthering its stated policy of not
It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio.., in accordance with the orders of the
Commission, in cases where the Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds
such action necessary or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical
connections with other carriers, to establish through routes and charges applicable
thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide facilities
and regulations for operating such through routes.
Id.
117. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (Supp. V 1999).
118. See ild. §§ 251(c)(1), 252.
119. See id § 252. For an excellent description of the structure of ILEC interconnection
negotiations, including the supervision by the state Public Utility Commissions and the
federal courts, see Weiser, supra note 73.
120. Title 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (Supp. V 1999) defines "telecommunications carrier" as a
carrier offering "telecommunications service," and 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (Supp. V 1999) says
"telecommunications services" are common carrier services.
121. Oxman, supra note 8, at 3-6; Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and
"Telecommunications Services," Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and
Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 227-32 (1999)
(discussing the definition of "information services" and its application by the FCC to the
Internet).
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (Supp. V 1999) (defining "information service");
Weinberg, supra note 121, at 227-32.
123. See Weinberg, supra note 121, at 232-34.
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regulating the Internet. 4 Because the Act's legal interconnection
requirements do not directly apply to Internet carriers, those carriers have
no legal basis apart from the antitrust laws on which to demand
interconnection with each other. 12
Nevertheless, even though the Communications Act does not provide
a basis for Internet carriers to demand interconnection with one another, the
Act, and the FCC's regulations under the Act, do extend the reach of
Internet carriers by requiring interconnection between Internet carriers and
some telecommunications carriers. As a threshold matter, an Internet
carrier can always get interconnection with a telecommunications carrier by
simply forming an affiliated telecommunications carrier which can then
demand interconnection, or by gaining interconnection to the entire
telecommunications network through an agreeable telecommunications
carrier. This strategy may not be optimal, for it may increase an Internet
carrier's costs compared to direct interconnection and it may create
obligations to make interconnection payments. Yet, as a legal matter,
interconnection should be available through an affiliate. 
26
Additionally, a telecommunications carrier's nondiscrimination duty
requires it to treat an Internet carrier as if it were any other customer, i.e.,
without regard to its status as an Internet carrier.127 Thus, dial-up ISPs could
(and did) simply buy business lines or trunk groups from the ILEC and
connect their modem pools to those lines.
Moreover, the biggest ILECs have long been required, under FCC
regulations, to provide access services to ISPs and other information
service providers. In the 1990s, the FCC promulgated open network
architecture ("ONA") and comparably efficient interconnection ("CEr')
rules that required ILECs to identify a basket of telecommunications
services that must be offered to information service providers. 128 In part, the
124. E.g., Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomm. Capability,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011,
24,030, 13 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 1, 12 (1998).
125. In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit,
unbidden by any party to do so, labeled cable Internet access service a "telecommunications
service." IL at 878-80. The FCC has specifically refused to endorse this decision, see Notice
of Inquiry, supra note 42, paras. 14-24, and other courts have disagreed, see id. But, if the
Ninth Circuit is right, then section 251's interconnection obligations would seem to attach to
this Internet service.
126. See Critique of Open Access Rules, supra note 31, at 68-69 (2000).
127. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994) (the 1934 Act's nondiscrimination obligation).
128. See generally Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facils., Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 506
(1992).
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rules required the development of certain new transport tariffs. 129 But their
real bite came from the FCC's requirement that these biggest ILECs make
available to other information service providers any transport services that
the ILECs used in their own information service offerings."o The FCC has
held that these requirements survive the 1996 Act's more specific ILEC
interconnection requirements and extend interconnection rights to ISPs
even though ISPs have no interconnection rights under section 251."3 The
unbundling required by the ONA and CEI rules ensures that the
telecommunications service that is used in conjunction with the information
services is available to other information service providers.
C. Economic Dimensions of Interconnection
As the ubiquitous telephone network and the Internet demonstrate,
significant value rests in interconnection. For communications services in
particular, consumer value depends on the extent of interconnection to
other consumers. Economists call this phenomenon "network effects" or
"network externalities," but those are only the names they have placed on
the simple intuition that, for some goods, the value of the good depends on
the number of people consuming the good and the number of people on (or
in) the network. This Section briefly summarizes some of the lessons of
network economics: the manner in which networks have value, the manner
in which network effects can create barriers to entry, and the manner in
which network effects can affect innovation in associated markets.
Network economics focuses on those markets in which consumer
demand for goods or services depends upon the number of other consumers
also expected to consume the same good or service.'3 2 A telephone or a fax
machine is not terribly useful if no one else buys one; each becomes more
useful as more people have them. To some extent, network effects resemble
129. Id. para. 121.
130. Id. paras. 11-12.
131. Telecomm. Act of 1996, First Report and Order, supra note 6, paras. 610-11.
132. The following summary addresses only so-called "direct" network effects, in which
the feedback effect arises directly from consumers purchasing the good in question. Such
direct networks as telephones, fax machines, and Internet access are different from
"indirect" networks typically characterized by the presence of a durable hardware good and
complementary software goods. In markets such as those for CD players and CDs, or
computer operating systems and applications, the feedback effect results because a larger
number of persons buying the hardware good induces a greater number and variety of
compatible software goods, thus making the hardware good more attractive. On this point,
and on network economics, see generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 426-27 (1985);
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. Rev. 479 (1998).
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economies of scale, where goods are cheaper to produce as more are
produced; but network effects are entirely a result of changes in how
consumers value the good based on the number of others consuming it, and
hence are a demand-side phenomenon.
33
Where network effects occur, products or manufacturers may become
entrenched. Consumers may be unwilling to switch to a new technology,
even if that technology is better or cheaper, if they are not convinced that a
sufficient number of other consumers will also switch. In other words,
consumers may value the current network's interconnectedness more than
they value the new technology. 34 The corollary is that the current owners
of the networks will often have strong incentives to exclude rivals,
especially new entrants.
Where there are network effects, one manner of decreasing the
barriers to entry is an interconnection technology or requirement. In this
manner, new (and smaller) companies can connect to the incumbent's
installed base.13 It is for this reason that communications law (from the
1934 Communications Act to and including the Telecommunications Act
of 1996) has always included interconnection requirements. Without the
ability for new companies to promise customers that they will also be able
to place calls to and receive calls from subscribers of the incumbent
telephone carriers, new entrants would never stand a chance.
37
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMON CARRIER RULES
This Part provides a relevant history of common carrier rules in order
to lay the groundwork for an Internet interconnection requirement. The
English common law imposed special duties on certain professions to serve
all who sought service, on just and reasonable terms, and without
discrimination.38 Beginning in the 1800s, English and American statutes
133. See generally Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 673 (1996).
134. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 825 (1986).
135. See, e.g., Stanley Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How To Compete: Strategies
and Tactics in Standardization, J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 120 (Spring 1994).
136. See id.
137. See generally Critique of Open Access Rules, supra note 31, at 81-82 (discussing
the interconnection requirements of the 1934 and 1996 Acts as explicitly favoring new
entrants and solving the entrenching aspects of network effects).
138. The common law of common callings was much broader and more complex than
these three issues and, to some extent, was more focused on concerns other than the duties
to provide service on just and reasonable terms and without discrimination. In its earliest
stages, the law of common callings developed to provide a cause of action (unknown
previously) against those who refused to serve. It was also first concerned with defining a
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
applied these rules-what are now called common carrier rules-to the
dominant mode of transportation, the newly emerging railroads. In 1910,
Congress partially extended the common carrier regulation of railroads to
telephone and telegraph companies, finding that the carriage of electronic
intelligence should be regulated in the same manner as the carriage of
goods and passengers. In many states, courts and legislatures had already
declared telegraphy and telephony to be common carrier services. Finally,
in 1934, the Communications Act imposed a fuller set of common carrier
duties, and the FCC was created to provide an independent and more
vigorous enforcement of these rules.
The history of common carrier duties in general, and of the common
carrier interconnection requirement in particular, illuminates the reasons
supporting the imposition (and the occasional elimination) of those
requirements. Common carrier duties have been imposed based variously
upon theories of de facto and de jure monopoly, on the theory that the
enterprise had become "essential," and upon theories that the enterprise
was publicly concerned in a particular manner. As will become apparent,
many of these factors exist in the current Internet and may therefore
support the application of common carrier-type rules to Internet carriers.
Even more importantly, the history of common carrier regulation shows the
particular importance of interconnection requirements. Such requirements,
which were most prevalent in later statutory common carrier schemes, both
helped create unified bearer networks and enabled the development of
competitive markets adjunct to more concentrated ones.
A careful review of this history should also shed some light on the
difference between common carrier duties and mandatory unbundling as
embodied both in some provisions of the 1996 Act and in more radical
proposals for Internet regulation. On the whole, common carriers were
required to interconnect, but they were not required to refrain from
participation in related markets and they were not required to sell their
service at wholesale prices to their competitors. As noted above, both
proposals are currently presented as solutions to various Internet carrier
disputes. The historical review here demonstrates that such market
quarantine or mandatory wholesaling requirements were not typically part
of common carrier duties. In Part V, I will argue that they should not
typically be part of common carrier duties for Internet carriers.
standard of care for those engaged in businesses. See generally JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, art. VIII (9th ed. 1878); 1 MAURICE ROBERTS,
FEDERAL LIABILITIES OF CARRIERS, §§ 50-107 (2d ed. 1929); M.E. HOLDSWORTH, THE LAW
OF TRANSPORT (1932). These branches of carrier law, while still important, are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Before launching into the history, two notes (caveats, perhaps) about
methodology are in order. First, this Part does not attempt to
comprehensively review the history of all of the undertakings that have
been subjected, at some time or another, to common carrier duties, nor does
it attempt to discuss all of the duties to which common carriers have been
subjected. Rather, the principal focus is on the railroad, telegraph, and
telephone industries, although some attention is paid to the common law of
common carriage. Moreover, the inquiry is focused on two particulars:
identifying the reasons for imposing common carriers duties, and
identifying the content of the specific interconnection and
nondiscrimination duties to which those carriers were subject. This focus is
appropriate. In the United States, railroad regulation under the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887 provided the basis for almost all of the significant
common carrier regulation that followed. 39 Moreover, the regulation of
telegraphs and telephones is most analogous to current interconnection
disputes on the Internet. The specific substantive focus is thus simply an
attempt to mine the history for those facts most relevant to the project at
hand.
Second, the focus on the historical reasons for imposing legal duties is
a particularly legal manner of approaching the question of current
regulations for Internet carriers. Alternative approaches-such as
attempting to create economic models that capture the Internet market and
arguing based on those models whether regulation is necessary-are
certainly possible and desirable. 40 Nevertheless, both approaches seem to
contribute to the ultimate conclusion: history can demonstrate the market
factors that have been considered important. Part of the project in Part V
will be to interpret the lessons of history in light of the relevant differences
in Internet markets and in light of current economic theory.
A. The Common Law and Regulation Before 1887
The early common law focused first on the duty to serve and on the
standard of care required by a person engaged in a common calling. At this
139. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 1323, 1333-34 (1998).
The Interstate Commerce Act-in its substantive requirements of just, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory rates and practices, in its procedural device of publicly
filed tariffs setting forth these rates and practices, and in its disallowance of
deviations from the tariffs-was essentially copied by Congress and the states into
numerous subsequent regulatory acts.
Id.
140. I have used such an approach in a prior writing on open access rules for cable
Internet services. See Critique of Open Access Rules, supra note 31; Vertical Dimension,
supra note 31.
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stage, the law responded to the development of a class of persons engaged
in trades as their full-time professions. In the prior era of the common law,
in which the agrarian, feudal model dominated, the common law provided
no remedy where a person refused to perform an undertaking for which he
had not yet received consideration, and it refused to impose liability for
negligent work unless the parties had explicitly contracted for a particular
result.
The judge-made law of common callings created an action against
tradesmen who had held themselves out to actually serve the public and to
do so with ordinary skill. 141 Thus, the law created actions that required
those engaged in serving the public to, in fact, serve the entire public with
reasonable care. The duties applied to all persons doing business generally
open to the public, not simply to carriers, and turned on whether the person
had made the business his "calling.', 42 A famous case from 1441 shows
that the key to liability under the common law of common callings was a
showing that the defendant was engaged in the activity as his business, and
not merely casually or intermittently. 4 1 Writing in the early 1900s, Bruce
141. These were actions on the case of two different kinds. An action based on a
defendant's wrongful refusal of service was an action on the case in the nature of an
assumpsit, and it proceeded upon the theory that a person engaged in a common calling had
made a representation (agreement) to serve all who applied. Because the defendant was
engaged in a common calling, the promise could be enforced despite the absence of
consideration. An action alleging that the defendant had injured the plaintiff while
practicing a common calling was a pure action on the case (i.e., a tort action). In this regard,
the innovation in the common law was that, prior to the development of actions based on
common callings, the law provided no relief from negligence unless the parties had
specifically contracted for a particular result. See generally F. B. Ames, The History of
Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1888).
142. Blackstone's classic summary proceeds as follows:
There is also in law always an implied contract with a common inn-keeper, to
secure his guest's goods in his inn; with a common carrier or bargemaster, to be
answerable for the goods he carries; with a common farrier, that he shoes a horse
well, without laming him; with a common taylor, or other workman, that he
performs his business in a workmanlike manner: in which if they fail, an action on
the case lies to recover damages for such breach of their general undertaking. But
if I employ a person to transact any of these concerns, whose common profession
and business it is not, the law implies no such general undertaking; but in order to
charge him with damages, a special agreement is required. Also if an inn-keeper,
or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travellers, it is an
implied engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way; and upon this
universal assumpsit, an action on the case will lie against him for damages, if he
without good reason refuses to admit a traveller.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 164.
143. The court dismissed plaintiff's suit against a horse surgeon: "You have not shown
that he is a common surgeon to cure such horses, and so, although he killed your horse by
his medicines, you shall have no action against him without an assumpsit." Y.B. 19 Hen. 6,
49, pl. 5 (1441) (Paston, J.), cited in Ames, supra note 141, at 4.
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Wyman suggested that in the infancy of England's trade economy, these
duties applied to all trades and businesses, because in any area, few persons
were engaged in each trade.'44 Indeed, during the middle ages, Parliament
reinforced the common law duties of tradesmen by passing statutes
specifically requiring almost all workers and tradesmen to serve the public
generally and to do so on just and reasonable terms. 145
As the common law emerged into the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, however, cases based on the law of common callings focused on
a narrow set of trades and professions: carriers of all kinds, and occupations
(such as warehousing) associated with transportation-most notably
innkeepers. 46 In a series of books and articles, Wyman explained this
narrowing by arguing that common carrier duties were applied only to
those occupations that continued to exhibit effective monopoly. 147 These
duties were applicable in earlier times because transportation was very
limited and because each town's craftsmen, therefore, had monopolies in
their own services. Later, the duties of common calling focused on
innkeepers and carriers because those occupations entailed legal or
economic monopolies. By contrast to Wyman, Charles Burdick, also
writing in the early 1900s, 141 challenged this view, noting that common
carrier duties were often imposed without a specific finding of monopoly
power. Burdick argued that the callings could be identified by a number of
indicators that the enterprise was considered "public." First, common
carrier duties were applied to those activities which historically had been
provided by the king or under the king's writ. Second, common carrier
duties applied when the public had assisted the enterprise in some
. 149
manner-through public spending, a grant of eminent domain
authority,'5" the use of public property, 5' or the establishment of a legal
144. Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem,
17 HARV. L. REV. 156 (1904).
145. BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS
AND ALL OTHERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT § 17, at 15 (1911).
146. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) ("it has been customary in England from
time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common
carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, & c. [sic], and in so doing to fix
a maximum charge to be made").
147. See Wyman, supra note 144; WYMAN, supra note 145; JOSEPH H. BEALE, JR. &
BRUCE WYMAN, CASES ON PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES, PUBLIC CARRIERS, PUBLIC WORKS,
AND OTHER PUBLIC UTILIrIES (3d ed. 1920). Wyman was not the only one to hold this view.
See, e.g., WILLIAM ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 17 (2d ed.
1962); ELI CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITY 25 (1950).
148. See Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service
Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 616, 743 (1911).
149. Id. at 632-33.
150. Id. at 629.
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monopoly. 52 When the legislature had acted in one of these manners, the
courts drew on the law of common callings to require that the enterprise
serve all.
Viewed from a current perspective, it seems that Burdick's view, in
which the imposition of common carrier duties included, but also extended
beyond, the scope of simple monopoly, is the more accurate. In part, the
views may be reconciled by a shift in the roles of court and legislature. In
the early common law period, the common law judges were the center of
legal authority and they alone set the terms of commercial interaction.
Later, after Parliament's supremacy became more or less settled (during a
time in which free-market ideas were also more in currency),'" judges were
more reluctant to impose common carrier duties without an indication from
the legislature. That indication was often found in one of the typical forms
of public support mentioned above. Moreover, judges were reluctant to
question the wisdom of legislative controls of business, and hence did not
inquire deeply into the monopoly question.
The early common carrier cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court bear out this conclusion. Munn v. Illinois54 is the classic
case for students of regulated industry. Munn antedated the Interstate
Commerce Act by eleven years, but it was decided in an era in which the
railroads and their associated businesses had already become the dominant
mode of transportation and otherwise dominated a new commercial
economy. The 1870 Illinois Constitution and 1871 state legislation imposed
rate caps and required Chicago grain elevators to serve all customers. The
Supreme Court upheld this legislation against dormant commerce clause,
takings, and due process challenges on the grounds that the elevators were
"public callings" and that the legislation was consistent with historic
regulation of public callings. 155 The opinion has two strands: that of
common carrier duties regulating monopoly, and that of public interest
more generally. Drawing on the writings of Lord Hale, the Court
emphasized that the common law had always imposed a duty to serve at
[T]he potential general usefulness of an undertaking to the members of a
community justifies the grant of the power of eminent domain for the furtherance
of the undertaking, and the acceptance of such a grant carries with it the duty to
use such powers reasonably and impartially for the benefit of all applicants ....
Id.
151. Id. at 632-34.
152. Id. at 620.
153. See LARS GROTON, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CARRIER IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAw 27-29 (1971).
154. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
155. Id. at 133-36.
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just and reasonable prices upon those holding a legal or factual monopoly
156
over transportation and similar services. But, the Court also emphasized
that certain professions-again, typically transportation and similar
services-were affected by "public interest" in that all members of the
public needed to rely on their availability.5 7 In applying these precedents to
the case at hand, the Court found that the grain elevators in Chicago were
controlled by nine firms which jointly agreed on prices. 8 The Court also
found that almost all grain from Western states passed through the Chicago
elevators on the way to the East. 59
Many commentators have read Munn as standing for the proposition
that common carrier duties to serve and rate regulation were imposed only
when a monopoly was proved.'60 This is too narrow a reading. In Munn, the
Court made it clear that it required no proof of the actual monopoly power
of the Chicago grain elevators. Rather, the Court's holding rested on the
notion that warehousing generally was subject to such regulation and that,
if the legislature saw fit to regulate it, the Court would not inquire
further.16' If Munn itself leaves any doubt, the Supreme Court in Brass v.
North Dakota ex reL Stoeser 62 made clear that the Munn's approval of
common carrier regulation by statute applied whenever the legislature saw
fit to regulate an appropriate commercial endeavor. In Brass, the Court
relied on Munn's holding that "it [was] competent for the legislative power
to control the business of elevating and storing grain.' ' 63 Because the
enterprise was of a type customarily regulated in this manner, the Court
would not review the legislative findings to determine whether, in fact, the
regulation responded to a concern of actual monopoly.
64
At common law, a common carrier had a duty to serve, and common
carriers that transported goods (or otherwise were bailees) generally were
insurers of the goods entrusted to them. From our perspective, the duty to
156. ld. at 128-29.
157. Id. at 130.
158. Id. at 131.
159. Id.
160. E.g., Wyman, supra note 144, at 222-25; GROTON, supra note 153, at 30-31.
161. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 132-33.
For our purposes we must assume that, if a state of facts could exist that would
justify such legislation, it actually did exist when the statute now under
consideration was passed. For us the question is one of power, not of
expediency.... Of the propriety of legislative interference within the scope of
legislative power, the legislature is the exclusive judge.
Id.
162. 153 U.S. 391 (1894).
163. Id. at 403.
164. Id. at 403-04.
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serve was the fundamental common carrier duty. This duty was
fundamental because it extended the enterprise, and because a carrier could
not easily modify the rules through contract. Of course, the duty did not
require a person practicing a common calling to provide any service that he
did not typically provide-even if that service was related to the "common"
service or was otherwise within the capacity of the person practicing the
common calling.165
The common law of common carriage did, however, omit two of the
obligations that were generally imposed on common carriers by later
statutory enactments. First, at common law, the nondiscrimination
obligation was relatively weak. Courts repeatedly held that there was no
breach of the nondiscrimination obligation if two people were charged
different prices for the same service, so long as each of the prices was
reasonable. 166 Furthermore, the common law did not permit any inquiry intoS • 167
the equivalence of charges for services that were not identical. Second,
and more importantly for current purposes, the common law imposed no
obligation on railroads (or other carriers) to interconnect with the lines of
other carriers or to establish joint or through rates for services. Although
common carriers were bound to receive traffic from all submitting shippers,
whether those shippers were customers or other carriers, the duty extended
only to those points, and in those manners, in which the carriers themselves
offered service. There was no obligation to establish either a physical
• 168
connection or a joint business operation.
B. Railroad Regulation
The first great federal legislation imposing common carrier duties was
of course the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA), 16 and it was
165. KENT'S COMMENTARIES *590.
166. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. B&O R.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 275 (1892)
(collecting common law cases).
167. Id. at 283-84.
168. See Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Denver & New Orleans R.R. Co., 110
U.S. 667, 680-82 (1884) (no common law requirement that railroads interconnect); Wis.,
Minn. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jacobsen, 179 U.S. 287, 296 (1910). As applied to telephone, see
Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 703 (D. Wash. 1912) (no common law
requirement for telephone companies to interconnect); State v. Cadwallader, 87 N.E. 644
(1909); Okla.-Ark. Tel. Co. v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 45 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1930) (no common
law or statutory duty to interconnect).
169. An Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). Prior to the federal legislation,
most states had imposed common carrier duties and rate regulations on the railroads, and the
U.S. Supreme Court had held on a number of occasions that railroads were common
carriers, both under common law tests and under their state charters. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v.
Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 377 (1873); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S.
155, 161 (1876); Atchison, 110 U.S. at 674-75. But the Supreme Court, in the decision that
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similarly based both upon strictly economic concerns over the abuse of
monopoly power and upon less strict economic notions that the railroads
had a duty to serve the public interest. The original ICA imposed variants
of the traditional common carrier duties to serve at just and reasonable
prices, and without discrimination. But it was not until several subsequent
amendments that railroads were subjected to mandatory and effective
interconnection requirements. The resulting national rail network
revolutionized commerce.
The original ICA was motivated by concerns over the abuse of
monopoly, but also over more public interest concerns. The ICA
principally imposed requirements of just and reasonable rates and
conditions of service, nondiscrimination, and tariff-filing. It also included a
mild prohibition on short- and long-haul price discrimination. The
nondiscrimination and short/long-haul provisions grew out of monopoly-
related concerns, for the short/long-haul discrimination was possible only
because carriers lacked competition on interior routes. Price discrimination
between large and small volume shippers was perceived to be a result of
the railroads' cartel over certain routes. 70 The ICA did not, however, limit
its rate regulation or nondiscrimination duties to routes or instances of clear
market power, and even the ICA's most ardent legislative advocates
recognized that many railroad routes (the long hauls) were the subject of
competition.17 ' The ICA was thus also based upon notions that the public
had supported the development of the railroads and was entitled to ensure
that their operation continued in the public interest generally. In response to
arguments that competition would discipline the abuses of the railroads, the
crucial Cullom Report flatly states, 'This answer fails to recognize the
public nature and obligations of the carrier, and the right of the people,
through the Governmental authority, to have a voice in the management of
a corporation which performs a public function.' ' 2 The railroads, in fact,
were generally commissioned by special state charters and were alwaysS • 173
given the right of eminent domain. Though not fully public, their "roads"
provided the spur for the ICA, held in Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 118
U.S. 557 (1886), that the dormant commerce clause forbade states from regulating rates of
interstate shipments.
170. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 139; Clyde B. Aitchison, The
Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act. 1887-1937, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289 (1937);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 131-48 (1991).
171. See SHELBY M. CULLOM, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, THE CULLOM
REPORT OF 1886, reprinted in 1 THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 31,
59 (Bernard E. Schwartz ed., 1973).
172. Id. at 58.
173. In the initial Senate debate, Senator Palmer stated:
Under our somewhat complicated system of government the railroads were
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were considered public roads for taxing, postal, and other purposes.17 4
It took several amendments to the ICA before it unambiguously
required railroads to interconnect their lines. The original ICA did not
require railroads to interconnect or to establish joint or through routes.""
The 1906 Hepburn Act gave the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC")
authority to order such interconnection and through routes. 176 The 1910
Mann-Elkins Act required carriers to interconnect and establish through
routes without prior Commission order.17 And the 1920 Transportation Act
gave the ICC power to require railroads to extend their lines and to build
facilities to facilitate interconnection.1
The result of this mandatory interconnection requirement was,
eventually, the creation of an integrated rail network. 179 After this
integrated network emerged, it permitted a revolution in the provision of
commodities and other goods across great distances.,"° Moreover, rail
transportation had such an advantage over all alternatives that, for a
significant period of time at the beginning of the twentieth century, "[a]ll
industrial and commercial activity was closely dependent upon rail
connections..'' Moreover, it simply revolutionized certain industries,
especially agriculture, and permitted the urbanization of America.1
8 2
chartered by States, who bestowed upon them the right of eminent domain, and
they were builded [sic] wholly or in part by contributions directly from the State
or by the people along their line, and they were intended for the common and
equal service of all who chose to make use of them .... It was believed that the
railway, like the toll-roads of that day, would be built by one company and used
by any and all who chose to prepare suitable carriages.
Id. at 103-04.
174. E.g., id. at 43-44; see also Atchison, 110 U.S. at 680-82 (collecting mid-nineteenth
century state constitutions declaring railways to be public highways).
175. Joint or through routes are simply services provided over the lines of more than one
railroad, but tariffed and offered to the public by one (or all) of the participating railroads.
See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 745, 746
nn.2-3 (1961).
176. Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
177. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 552 (1910); see Interstate Commerce
Comm'n v. N. Pac. Ry., 216 U.S. 538 (1910) (finding that, under Hepburn Act, carriers
were not required to interconnect or establish through routes until ICC ordered such action).
178. Transportation Act, 41 Stat. 456 (1920); see generally, I ISAIAH SHARFMAN, THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 240-43 (1931).
179. See generally DUDLEY F. PEGRUM, TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 55-58 (1961).
180. Id. at 12-17.
181. Id. at 515.
182. Id.; see generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1196 (1986).
It would be difficult to overstate the centrality of the railroads to the national
economy in the post-Civil War period .... As the country expanded westward
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C. Telegraphs and Telephones
The history of common carrier regulation of telephone companies
demonstrates a similar dual concern with controlling monopoly and, more
generally, with declaring telephony to be a public enterprise. The original
ICA did not include telegraph and telephone carriers within its jurisdiction.
It was not until 1910, with the Mann-Elkins Act, that the ICA's common
carrier duties were partially extended to these new electronic carriers. Prior
to 1910, courts struggled with common law claims that telegraph and
telephone companies were common carriers and should be subjected to
common carrier duties. The earliest cases refused to find that telegraph and
telephone companies were common carriers, because the courts could not
conceive of them as "carriers" of anything Nevertheless, most courts
found telegraph and telephone companies to be at least quasi-common
carriers or public service companies and subjected them to similar duties of
service and nondiscrimination."8 The decisions rested mainly on the
support the state gave to telegraph and telephone companies through
• • 185
franchises and the power of eminent domain. Some decisions also note,
and rural outpost communities proliferated, economic inter-dependency-among
producer, warehouser, merchant, and consumer-made the position and practices
of the railroads all-pervasive in importance.
Id. at 1197.
183. E.g., Grinnell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299 (1873).
The liability of a telegraph company is quite unlike that of a common carrier. A
common carrier has the exclusive possession and control of the goods to be
carried, with peculiar opportunities for embezzlement or collusion with
thieves .... A telegraph company is intrusted with nothing but an order or
message, which is not to be carried in the form in which it is received, but is to be
transmitted or repeated by electricity ....
Id. at 301-02.
184. The principal debate over declaring telegraph companies subject to the full panoply
of common law common carrier duties arose over those companies' liability for service
failures and, conversely, their ability to limit liability by contract or tariff. In general,
common carriers of goods were strictly liable for nondelivery or damage of goods, in part to
eliminate difficult questions of proof when all of the facts would be within the carrier's
control and to eliminate the consequent opportunities for carrier misfeasance. See generally
STORY, supra note 138, §§ 489-90. Out of recognition that electric communications were
not yet proved, courts generally did not hold telegraph companies strictly liable and
permitted those companies to limit their liability by contract or tariff. See, e.g., Grinnell, 113
Mass. at 299; Bartlett v. W. Union Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209 (1873); W. Union Tel. Co. v.
Priester, 276 U.S. 252 (1928). See also generally The Law of Telegraphs and Telegrams, 13
AM. L. REGISTER 193 (1865) (discussing earlier cases on common carrier obligations of
telegraph companies); Liability of Telegraph Companies for Fraud Accident, Delay, and
Mistakes in the Transmission and Delivery of Messages, 32 AM. L. REGISTER 281, 353
(1884) (same); The Law Relating to Telephones, 37 AM. L. REGISTER 65, 70-71 (1889)
(same for telephone companies).
185. See, e.g., Mar v. W. Union Tel. Co., 3 S.W. 496 (Tenn. 1887).
There is, however, much analogy between the common carrier and the telegraph
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however, that in many locales the telegraph or telephone company had a
virtual monopoly over its service, 116 and some decisions rest on no more
than a declaration that the companies had come to provide a "necessary"
service to the public.'87
The Mann-Elkins Act, 8  as the 1910 amendment to the ICA was
known, principally concerned railroad matters, and the regulation of
telephone and telegraph companies was added by way of a floor
amendment with very little debate. 1" 9 The Mann-Elkins Act, moreover, did
not extend all of the ICA's provisions to telephone and telegraph carriers.
In particular, while the Act declared telephone and telegraph companies to
be common carriers and subjected those companies to the Act's just and
reasonable rates and nondiscrimination requirements, it did not require
telephone and telegraph carriers to establish interconnections with each
other or to file tariffs.' 90 As a result, the ICC was hampered in regulating
company. Both are in the exercise of a quasi public occupation, and both have by
the public conferred upon them valuable franchises, and both may and do invoke
the high prerogative of exercising the state's right of eminent domain. The
obligation to serve the public without discrimination, and for reasonable charges,
is imposed upon both occupations. The use of the facilities afforded by telegraph
companies has become as much of a public necessity as were common carriers at
the same relative stage of development.
Id. at 498-99. In 1901, the Supreme Court applied common law common carrier principles
to a telegraph company's charges. It wrote: "Common carrers... are performing a public
service. They are endowed by the State with some of its sovereign powers, such as the right
of eminent domain, and so endowed by reason of the public service they render. As a
consequence of this, all individuals have equal rights both in respect to service and charges."
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1901).
186. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525, 533 (1867); Am. Rapid Tel. Co. v.
Conn. Tel. Co., 49 Conn. 352 (1881).
187. E.g., Hockett v. State, 5 N.E. 178 (Ind. 1886).
[The telephone] has become as much a matter of public convenience and of public
necessity as were the stage-coach and sailing vessel a hundred years ago, or as the
steam-boat, the railroad, and the telegraph have become in later years. It has
already become an important instrument of commerce. No other known device
can supply the extraordinary facilities which it affords. It may therefore be
regarded, when relatively considered, as an indispensable instrument of
commerce. The relations which it has assumed towards the public make it a
common carrier of news,--a common carrier in the sense in which the telegraph is
a common carrier,-and impose upon it certain well-defined obligations of a
public character. All the instruments and appliances used by a telephone company
in the prosecution of its business are consequently, in legal contemplation,
devoted to a public use.
Id. at 182.
188. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
189. See Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, The Common Carrier Provisions-A
Product of Evolutionary Development, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1934 25, 27-28 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
190. SeeMann-Elkins Act, §§ 7, 12.
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these newer carriers, and took little action with respect to communications
carriers.' 9'
The Communications Act of 1934 removed telephone and telegraph
companies from the ICC's jurisdiction, establishing the FCC to govern
those companies as well as radio transmissions. The common carrier
provisions of the Act largely copied the ICA.192 In 1934, there were no
burning issues forcing new regulation of telephone companies. Rather, the
Act responded to the facts that most states had established commissions
governing local telephone service and that the ICC felt overburdened by its
regulation of railroads.' 93
AT&T had "largely supported" the Mann-Elkins Act, for it sought
regulation as a complement to developing a monopoly on telephone
service. 194 In fact, in 1910 and (to a lesser extent) 1934, local telephony was
competitively provided in many areas. 9 5 The 1934 Act, however,
responded in part to the concerns of state regulators that the Bell System
had grown so big and powerful that state regulation had become
ineffective. 96 Although AT&T opposed the Act, it made clear that it did
not oppose regulation per se but only certain provisions of the Act that
increased the powers of the FCC beyond those held by the ICC.
19 7
Moreover, the 1934 Act was passed against the background of the so-called
Kingsbury Commitment, which resolved the first U.S. antitrust action
against the Bell System. One of the principal complaints leading to the
Kingsbury Commitment (and resolved by that undertaking) was that the
Bell System refused to interconnect its long-distance lines with unaffiliated
• 198
local telephone companies. Thus, section 201(a) requires interconnection
191. See Cox & Byrnes, supra note 189, at 28-29; Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal
Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OFTHE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1934, at 8 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
192. E.g., Cox & Byrnes, supra note 189, at 25; Robinson, supra note 191, at 3.
193. E.g., Cox & Byrnes, supra note 189, at 30.
194. Id. at n.39.
195. Robinson, supra note 191, at 7-8.
196. E.g., A Bill to Provide for the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communications
by Wire or Radio, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 2910 Before the Senate Comm.
on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1934). State regulators also sought
legislation to put certain limits on the federal regulators in order to preserve state authority
over intrastate rates in the face of the Supreme Court's decision in the Shreveport Rate Case
(Houston & Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)) that the ICC could determine
intrastate rates.
197. A Bill to Provide for the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communications by
Wire or Radio, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 165-71 (1934) (statement of
Walter S. Gifford, President, AT&T Co.).
198. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications
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upon FCC order.'" The legislative history indicates that the provision was
added because of the history of Bell's refusal to interconnect with
independent local telephone companies and to eliminate wasteful
duplication of facilities by competing carriers. 200
Title II of the 1934 Communications Act applied common carrier
duties to common carriers engaged in interstate communication by wire.
The Act's Title II jurisdiction, therefore, had three elements: (1) interstate
communication, (2) by wire, and (3) by common carriers. The first two
requirements are easily identified, but the Act defines a common carrier as
"any person engaged as a common carrier for hire,'' 20 ' and this definition's
202
circularity has been frequently noted . As the common law definition of
common carrier always has,203 the leading cases under the 1934 Act turn on
whether the carrier holds itself out indiscriminately to a class of persons for
service.2° Of course, the 1934 Act does not include any explicit monopoly
test before applying common carrier obligations. And, while the 1996 Act
does give the FCC expansive power to forbear from applying the 1934 Act
where competition has taken root, even this provision declares that
regulation may be eliminated only where nondiscriminatory service will
2'05
continue in its absence. In other words, the common carrier obligations of
the Communications Act were motivated by (and continued to be
motivated by) concerns over both monopoly and discrimination.
In two notable areas, however, the FCC has declared important
communications markets to be outside of the domain of common carriage,
and those decisions are instructive as to the rationale of common carrier
obligations. First, the FCC declared that customer premises equipment
206("CPE") would not be considered common carrier service. The
Commission found (and the courts agreed) that CPE did not constitute a
Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS LJ. 1395, 1404
n.22 (1999); GERALD W. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF
MARKET STRUCTURE 151-58 (1981).
199. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
200. See Cox & Byrnes, supra note 189, at 42-43 & n. 132.
201. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994).
202. E.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
203. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
204. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Nat'l
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d at 641; Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
205. See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1999).
206. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs., Second
Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 9, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 669 (1980), aft'd,
CIAA v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983) [hereinafter
Second Computer Inquiry].
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mandatory part of a common carrier's network. The FCC's principal reason
was that CPE could be independently interconnected to the network, as its
experience since the Carterfone decision had shown, and that innovation in
CPE could proceed independently of the network. 207 The FCC's secondary
reason (in reality, subsidiary to the first) was that competition among
multiple independent suppliers was possible in CPE markets. 20'
Even as the FCC was deregulating CPE as a competitive market, it
took pains to ensure the standardized interconnection between CPE and the
telecommunications network. The FCC set rules that specified the technical
characteristics of the interface between CPE and the network, and it
established a system through which manufacturers could have their
products qualified as meeting those standards.209 The FCC's explicit
purpose was "to provide for uniform standards" to maximize competition
210in the CPE market. These CPE rules have been extended to include not
only simple, single-line telephones, but also to more complicated private
211branch exchanges ("PBXs"), key telephone systems, and payphones.
Second, the FCC declared that computer services (later renamed
enhanced services, and now information services) were not common carrier
services under the Communications Act (or, perhaps more accurately,
would not be regulated as common carriers under the Act).212 The
Commission's principal reasoning was that the computer processing
industry was relatively new, was fairly competitive, and needed freedom
from regulation in order to innovate.213 Common carriers were permitted to
offer data processing services, so long as they separated their carrier
operations to protect against cross-subsidy and discrimination.1 4
207. Id. para. 141.
208. Id. para. 143, 144.
209. See Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll
Tel. Serv. (MTS) and Wide Area Tel. Serv. (WATS), First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d
593 (1975) [hereinafter MTS and WATS First Report and Order]; Proposals for New or
Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv. (MTS) and Wide Area
Tel. Serv. (WATS), Second Report and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976), aff'd, N.C. Utils.
Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter MTS and WATS Second Report
and Order].
210. See MTS and WATS First Report and Order, supra note 209, at 615.
211. See MTS and WATS Second Report and Order, supra note 209; Registration of Coin
Operated Tel. under Pt. 68 of the Commission's Rules and Regs., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 57 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 133 (1984).
212. Reg. and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Comm. Servs. and Facils., Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 21 Rad. Reg.2d (P
& F) 1591 (1971) [hereinafter First Computer Inquiry].
213. Id. paras. 31, 33.
214. Id. paras. 29, 30. Although the Second Computer Inquiry changed the terms from
"data processing" and "communications" to "enhanced" and "basic" services, the FCC kept
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In the information services realm, as noted above, the FCC acted as it
did with CPE to require the telephone companies to provide open,
standardized interconnection to the telephone network. Thus, the FCC
required the tariffing of Basic Service Elements-access elements that
information service providers could use for connecting with the public
switched telephone network-that would create the opportunity to use
215
network services flexibly, efficiently, and free from discrimination. The
FCC also attempted to require the telephone companies to offer
opportunities for information service providers to physically place their
equipment in telephone company offices, similar to the opportunities
216
enjoyed by the telephone companies' own affiliates.
There are a number of other instances of specific interconnection
rules being adopted in the history of telecommunications carriers. The most
famous of these instances is, of course, the 1984 breakup of the Bell
System, which was accomplished under the antitrust laws to ensure that
developing competitive long-distance carriers could enjoy efficient and
nondiscriminatory interconnection with local telephone monopolies.2 '7 The
breakup decree was the culmination of other. regulatory efforts that
attempted to create interconnection rights for non-Bell long-distance
218
carriers. Similarly, Congress and the FCC have supplied mandatory
21'9interconnection rules benefiting wireless companies and the competitive
"enhanced services" outside the scope of Title II for precisely the same reasons. Second
Computer Inquiry, supra note 206.
215. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs., Report
and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, paras. 177, 178, 60 Rad. Reg.2d 603 (1986), vacated in part,
California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Third Computer Inquiry].
216. Id. paras. 131-41. The Third Computer Inquiry did not specifically require such
physical collocation of competitors' equipment, although the Commission did express a
preference for such arrangements. Id. para. 218. Later Commission regulations attempting to
impose physical collocation were struck down by the D.C. Circuit when that court found
that the FCC had not been given the statutory authority to require a physical occupation of
property (which of course gave rise to constitutional takings concerns). See Bell At. Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Statutory authority requiring all incumbent local
exchange carriers to permit physical collocation was added to the 1934 Act by the 1996 Act.
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
217. See generally United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
(entering consent decree to break up Bell System as of January 1, 1984), aft'd, Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1984); Kearney, supra note 198, at 1412-19; Glen 0.
Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517 (1988); Roger Noll & Bruce Owen, The
Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION
290 (J. E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
218. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring the
FCC to revise its regulations to permit MCI to purchase interconnection from Bell
companies for its long-distance service).
219. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(B) ("Upon reasonable request of any person providing
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access providers that offered metropolitan bypass services to large
customers.220
One somewhat esoteric interconnection requirement provides an
example relevant to some of the Internet interconnection disputes,
especially the dispute over instant messaging. Prior to the break-up of the
Bell System, the routing of long-distance calls was simple because a local
switch simply delivered any long-distance call to a long-distance trunk
group attached to the switch. After the entry of multiple long-distance
carriers, however, the local switch needed to know to which long-distance
carrier to route the call. For the typical call, this was handled by a local
telephone company database (and later by each individual local company
switch) that simply created a database that matched each local line with a
221preferred long-distance company.
The matter was more complicated for 800 numbers, however, because
a local switch could not hold a database of all of the possible 800 numbers
and the long-distance company associated with those numbers. This meant,
initially, that a company could switch its 800 number from one long-
222distance carrier to another only by getting a new long-distance number. A
business was likely to have a substantial investment in a particular number
because, through advertising and otherwise, its customers had likely
learned its number (especially if it were a vanity number such as 1-800-
CAR-RENT) .223 Thus, even though there were multiple long-distance
carriers, there was not true competition in 800 number services because
224
companies could not easily switch among carriers.
The solution to this problem was the construction of a database that
contained the ownership information for each 800 number and the
development of protocols whereby a local switch could query the database
commercial mobile service, the Commission shall order a common carrier to establish
physical connections with such service pursuant to the provisions of section 201 of this
title."); The Need to Promote Competition and Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio
Common Carrier Servs., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1275
(1986); The Need to Promote Competition and Efficient Use of Spectrum for Radio
Common Carrier Servs., Declaratory Ruling, 2 F.C.C.R. 2910 (1987) (requiring local
telephone companies to provide nondiscriminatory interconnection for wireless carriers).
220. See Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facils., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5154, 75 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1040 (1994) (requiring virtual
collocation and the provision of facilities necessary for such interconnection).
221. See generally AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 229 (describing equal access regime);
Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R.
5880, paras. 117-25, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1135 (1991) (discussing equal access regime).
222. See Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6
F.C.C.R. 5880, paras. 10-18, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1135 (1991).
223. Id.
224. Id. atparas. 16-51.
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to determine the ownership of the 800 number being called (and thereby
determine how to route the call).2z The developers of these databases were
226required to provide the information to all requesting local carriers. A
similar database solution has been envisioned for local number portability,
which the 1996 Act mandates and which many see as a necessity for true
local telephone competition. 7
Thus, from the common carrier's duty to serve came a duty to
interconnect with other carriers engaged in similar enterprises. The
interconnection duty served numerous economic purposes, especially the
fostering of competition in markets adjacent to monopolistic markets and
the fostering of competition in markets that required the development of
substantial networks. Interconnection permitted smaller players and new
entrants to develop markets of their own and, occasionally, to reach the
scale necessary to compete with incumbent players. The duty to serve and
the interconnection duty also permitted new markets to develop-such as
agricultural markets and processing, the CPE markets, and the markets for
information services.
V. COMMON CARRIER RULES FOR INTERNET
INTERCONNECTION
The foregoing provides a foundation for determining the applicability
and content of common carrier interconnection rules for Internet carriers.
This Part first applies the legal history to Internet carriers to demonstrate
that they fit well within the tradition of common carriage. Next, the Part
argues that the economics of Internet carriage support a common carrier
duty of interconnection. In particular, the prospect of at least localized
monopoly and, in some segments, structural monopoly concerns, as well as
the likely persistence of strong network effects, argues for an
interconnection requirement. Third, this Part considers the technical
characteristics of Internet carriers and demonstrates that the analogy to
railroads and telecommunications carriers continues at the technological
level. Fourth, the Part considers some of the principal objections to
common carrier regulation, particularly the objection that rate regulation
will distort market incentives, dampen investment, and actually injure long-
term competition. This is a serious objection, and the Part develops a
common carrier interconnection requirement that provides only minimal
225. Id.
226. See id. para. 129.
227. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) ("Each local exchange carrier has... [t]he duty to
provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability"); Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 8352 (1996).
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opportunity for regulatory rate setting. To this end, the legal
interconnection requirement should be subject to enforcement only through
complaints to the FCC, with the FCC requiring a high threshold showing
before investigating. Moreover, the FCC should have authority, after
inquiry, to suspend the complaint mechanism. As has been done in several
telecommunications markets, full competition should permit substantial
deregulation, but only after a serious, open inquiry into the competitive
dimensions of those markets.
Throughout, this Part discusses the four examples of Internet
interconnection disputes, concluding that backbones should be subject to an
interconnection duty, as should telephone carriers and all ISPs, and that the
NPD underlying instant messaging should be required to be interoperable.
The Part also concludes that the unbundling that open access advocates
seek is not part of the traditional interconnection requirements and, because
of the risks of full-blown price regulation, should not be imposed.
A. The Legal Dimension
In the purely legal dimension, Internet carriers seem presumptively to
be common carriers. As the legal and historical surveys demonstrated,"'
the principal legal test for whether an entity is a common carrier is whether
it has held itself out to serve all indiscriminately, and most Internet carriers
seem to do so. Additionally, Internet carriers seem to exhibit at least some
of the public aspects which have accompanied the imposition of common
carrier duties, such as the indirect use of eminent domain powers and the
manner in which the Internet has become an essential aspect of commerce
and communication for many people and industries.
Internet carriers-backbones and ISPs-hold themselves out as
serving the public generally. Certainly at the retail level, backbones and
ISPs make their services generally available to the public at large, or to a
significant segment of the public. For example, many ISPs offer business
hosting services through standardized terms posted on their Web sites, and
virtually all ISPs offer their access services to all customers. At the carrier-
to-carrier level, many of the major backbones have recently published their
peering policies, stating that "[o]ther ISPs can now plan for the terms and
conditions we [the backbones] will be looking for... ."23 This willingness
228. See supra Parts III.B & IV.
229. See Jennifer Jones, UUNET Goes Public with Policy for ISP Peering Agreements,
INFoWORLD, Jan. 29, 2001, at 76b; Sarah L. Roberts-Witt, Opening the Books: Major
Telecom Players Make Their Peering Guidelines Public, INTERNET WORLD, Mar. 15, 2001,
at 14.
230. Jones, supra note 229, at 76b (quoting Vint Cerf, senior vice-president of Internet
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to serve any party that meets established criteria satisfies the historic legal
test for common carrier status.
The only Internet carrier market segment in which it is not entirely
clear that the service is provided on a common carrier basis is the market
for transit arrangements. Although the major backbones have made their
peering policies public, there is a clear trend away from peering and toward
the sale of wholesale transit. 11 These transit policies are not public, and
backbone carriers often require nondisclosure agreements to prevent those
purchasing transit from comparing terms. 23 Nevertheless, as the FCC's
recent working paper concluded, ISPs are able to purchase transit from
backbones 33 (although they are often disgruntled with the prices and other
234terms). Given that backbones seem to sell transit to all ISPs seeking that
service, common carrier status would be justified. In this regard, it is
important to note that the backbones' willingness to serve all ISPs justifies
common carrier status, even if (as seems unlikely235) the specific terms of
an interconnection agreement must be worked out individually with
customers.236
Internet carriers also exhibit some of the "public aspects" of common
carriers that would justify their status as such. Most Internet transmission
lines are converted lines originally installed by telecommunications
carriers, 23 and telecommunications carriers almost always have had the
power of eminent domain.23' Even where the lines have been newly
installed, they have either been installed in public rights of way or in the
architecture at UUNET).
231. Id. ("most large ISPs are now shying away from peering arrangements with smaller
players in favor of more lucrative wholesale deals for carrying Internet traffic ... 
Roberts-Witt, supra note 229, at 15.
232. See KENDE, supra note 20, at 7-8.
233. See id. at 21-22.
234. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
235. It seems unlikely, because bandwidth is available in well-defined quantities, and it
appears that transit arrangements are sold based upon the bandwidth demanded. See CLARK,
supra note 4, at 45 1.
236. See, e.g., Indep. Data Comms. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc.; Petition for a Declaratory Ruling
that AT&T's InterSpan Frame Relay Serv. Is a Basic Serv., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 13,717, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 409 (1995) (holding that AT&T's Frame
Relay Service is a telecommunications (common carrier) service, despite the need to deal
individually with each customer as to issues such as bandwidth demands) [hereinafter
Petition for Declaratory Ruling].
237. See KENDE, supra note 20, at 13.
238. See Jennifer Worstell, Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: A
Permanent Physical Appropriation of Private Property that Must Be Justly Compensated,
50 FED. COMM. L.J. 441,475-81 (1998).
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corridors of other carriers (such as railroads or pipelines),2 9 and those other
carriers had the power of eminent domain when they acquired the right of
240
way. Moreover, it is undeniable that the Internet has become a necessity
for many other businesses and a popular communications and commerce
medium for much of the public. Finally, the early involvement of ARPA
and the NSF provided an important, direct government subsidy to the241
development of the Internet, a factor which has often pointed in the
242direction of common carrier regulation.
This is not to say that Internet carriers are "telecommunications
carriers" and hence common carriers subject to the full obligations of the
Communications Act.243 It is certainly the case that backbones and ISPs
provide some transmission of information "without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received. ' 244 However, the
conclusion that Internet carriers are telecommunications common carriers
is not necessary to decide that they should, presumptively, be subject to
some sort of common carrier duties. Internet carriers are simply the most
recent form of carrier, following the great tradition of steamships, railroads,
and telephones; and all of their predecessors have been subject to some
form of common carrier regulation.
B. The Economic Dimension
On two economic dimensions, common carrier interconnection duties
seem appropriate for Internet carriers. Common carrier duties were also
imposed in situations where the carrier or other enterprise enjoyed either de
jure or de facto monopoly power, 24 and at least some segments of the
Internet carrier market are likely to exhibit at least localized monopoly
characteristics. Similarly, common carrier duties to serve and to
interconnect have been prevalent where the industry has had strong
246
network effects, and the Internet undoubtedly exhibits such effects.
239. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails
to Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the
Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 352, 362 (2000).
240. See Danaya C. Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways: Property Disputes and
Rails-to-Trails in Indiana, 30 IND. L. REv. 723, 725 (1997).
241. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
243. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (Supp. V 1999); see also supra notes 116-24 and
accompanying text.
244. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (definition of "telecommunications").
245. See supra notes 146-47, 170, 191-96, 206-14 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 137, 179-82 and accompanying text.
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Certain Internet carrier markets are concentrated. The backbone
market is somewhat concentrated, with only five or six current backbones
(depending on the source247) and with the top three backbones carrying a
majority of all long-haul traffic.248 Similarly, the market for high-speed
Internet access services is concentrated. Only two technologies are
currently proven to have any widespread adaptability to high-speed service:
cable systems and DSL service. In the absence of the unbundling of
physical loops, there would be only two providers in most residential
markets, for there is very little overbuilding of cable systems (and virtually
249no overbuilding of telephone systems). In the early broadband merger
case, the FCC took the position that high-speed Internet access was not a
separate market from the highly-competitive dial-up access market.50 More
recently, recognizing that certain next generation services (such as true
streaming video and enhanced interactive gaming) will likely be available
only through high-speed access services, the FCC (and others) have
recognized that broadband access is probably a different product.25
252Similarly, AOL's lead in instant messaging subscriptions is immense,
and there is no doubt that the incumbent local exchange carriers command
253
over ninety percent of the local telephone lines.
Three of the four example Internet markets are obviously subject to
network effects as well. Backbones, last-mile providers, ISPs, and dial-up
Internet customers all demand universal connectivity, and there is no doubt
that the Internet exhibits network effects in this regard.
As a result of widespread interconnection, end users currently have an
implicit expectation of universal connectivity whenever they log on to
247. See KENDE, supra note 20, at 7 ("Because of the non-disclosure agreements that
cover interconnection between backbones, it is difficult to state with accuracy the number of
top-tier backbones; according to one industry participant, there are five: Cable & Wireless,
WorldCom, Sprint, AT&T, and Genuity (formerly GTE Internetworking).") Id. at 12 (a
better number might be six).
248. See, e.g., WorldCom Complaint, supra note 16, para. 33 (citing studies).
249. See generally Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, FCC Report No. 01-389, paras.
119-20 (Jan. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Assessment Report]; Development of Competition in
Local Telephone Markets, Report to the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Bus. Rights and
Competition, Comm. on the Judiciary, GAO Report RCED-00-38, at 20-21 (Jan. 2000).
250. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 3160, 3192, 3197, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999) [hereinafter Consent Order].
251. See AOL/TW Merger Order, supra note 38, paras. 69-73; see also Jerry A.
Hausman, et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential
Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 302, 303-04 (2001) (discussing market definition question).
252. See supra note 43.
253. Miscellaneous Data from FCC Form 477, FCC No. 01-22, para. 12 (Jan. 12, 2001),
at http:llwww.fcc.govlBureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State-Linklcomp.html.
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the Internet, regardless of which ISP they choose. ISPs are therefore in
the business of selling access to the entire Internet to their end-user
customers; ISPs purchase this universal access from Internet
backbones. The driving force behind the need for these firms to deliver
access to the whole Internet to customers is what is known in the
economics literature as network externalities. 4
Instant messaging ("I"), too, exhibits direct network effects,
principally through the names and presence database. As discussed above,
an instant messaging service is valuable in connecting individuals to others
with whom they wish to communicate (and in the unique manner that
instant messaging permits). As a result, two people wishing to
communicate with each other need to be subscribed to the same service.
2 55
In the AOL/Time Warner merger, the FCC found that "NPD services
exhibit strong network effects. '5 6 It specifically found that the value of an
NPD service rose for each consumer as more consumers were subscribed to
that specific service. The FCC further found that a consumer's ability to
load more than one IM service on his or her computer was not an adequate
substitute: network effects still gave an advantage to the larger service.2
C. The Technical Dimension
The technical dimension of Internet interconnection also suggests that
duties similar to those applied to railroads and telecommunications carriers
are appropriate. In each of these predecessor carrier markets,
interconnection duties created the possibility of new services that used the
carrier as an important input. The Internet is the purest form of this.
Building off of the fully digital nature of applications, its standardized
protocols create the opportunity for the development of new applications
without interference from the network.
The early form of this benefit of interconnection can be seen in
railroads. The creation of a nationwide, interconnected rail network
depended upon two events: first, the standardization of track gauges that
254. KENDE, supra note 20, at 3 (emphasis in original).
255. See supra notes 44-46, 54-55 and accompanying text.
256. AOL71W Merger Order, supra note 38, para. 158.
257. Id.
[W]hen choosing between rival IM services, a typical new user will place the
greatest value on the service with the largest NPD (and therefore the most users)
and will choose that service. In all these hypothetical situations, the underlying
value (or lack of value) in an IM service resides in the NPD.
Id.
258. Id. para. 164 ("We find the ability of users to use several IM services is not a
substitute for interoperability."). The FCC found that this was particularly true with respect
to wireless handsets and handheld computers, which might not have the computer power or
storage capacity to operate more than one IM service. See id.
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made interconnection possible; and second, widespread interconnection as
a result of economic and legal pressures. Prior to the 1880s, American
railroads used many different track gauges, with the consequence that
traffic carried on one gauge could not, short of repackaging into new cars
or investing in multi-gauge cars or multi-gauge tracks, be shipped on other
219railroad lines. Prior to the 1880s, however, there was little demand for
such interconnection, as each railroad saw itself as a regional carrier and
principally concerned with interconnecting to water carriers, not to other
260
rail carriers. Pressure for gauge standardization resulted only when there
261
was perceived economic benefit from longer distance shipping. Once
tracks were standardized, the process of interconnection began in earnest.
Backed up by legal requirements added to the railroad laws in the late
1800s and early 1900s, interconnection resulted in a truly national• 263
network of railways. This network permitted an explosion in agricultural,
• 264
manufacturing, and service markets.
Similarly, the fully interconnected telephone network provided the
impetus for the development of new markets. This development includes
the expansion of shopping and business enterprises to a nationwide scale.
Of course, it includes the development of information services-precursors
to the Internet.265
As discussed above, the technical configuration of the Internet makes
the development of many new applications easier, because application
developers do not need to conform their data streams to any particular
protocol and because the TCP/IP inter-networking protocols do not interact
with the applications protocols. As three of the original developers of the
design schemes underlying the Internet have recently written, the Internet's
architecture "serves to remind us that building complex function into a
network implicitly optimizes the network for one set of uses while
substantially increasing the cost of a set of potentially valuable uses that
may be unknown or unpredictable at design time., 26 6 The number of new
259. See generally GEORGE R. TAYLOR & IRENE D. NEU, THE AMERICAN RAILROAD
NETWORK 1861-1890, 3-7 (1956); Douglas J. Puffert, The Standardization of Track Gauge
on North American Railways, 1830-1890, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 933, 935-37 (2000).
260. Puffert, supra note 258, at 944 ("The earliest commercial railways served only a
local, or at best regional, purpose: to connect cities with their hinterlands or the western
waterways, or to link water routes over territory that was unsuitable for canals.").
261. Id. at 945-50.
262. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., SHARFMAN, supra note 178, at 172-3; LEWIS H. HANEY, A
CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES 20-30 (1968).
264. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 121.
266. Reed et al., supra note 115, at 70.
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applications developed for the Internet-from Web-browsing, to Napster,
to instant messaging-is a testament to that system's flexibility.267
In other words, common carrier services have long served as bearer
services for many other economic enterprises. The Internet, based both on
its design principles and on the actual experience, is a very important
bearer service.
D. The Fully Specified Model
Legal, economic, and technical precedents suggest that Internet
carriers should be subject to common carrier interconnection duties. At the
same time, the regulatory system should attempt to limit the scope of price
regulation and the possibilities for the abuse of the regulatory process. As
so specified, these common carrier duties should avoid the principal
criticisms of price regulation, but should also be superior to relying
exclusively on the antitrust laws to monitor Internet markets. An important
aspect of avoiding the dangers of price regulation is distinguishing between
interconnection and unbundling rules. Common carrier regulation required
interconnection, but it almost never required the carrier to unbundle its own
network to develop a wholesale service that other entities could sell as their
own. The Internet, as a network, demands interconnection; it does not
demand unbundling.
The mandatory interconnection obligation should require Internet
carriers to interconnect with other carriers or with end users. In order to
limit the costs imposed on the party from whom interconnection is being
demanded, the carrier demanding interconnection should be required to
build its own facilities to a point of interconnection with the carrier.
Because Internet carriers already substantially interconnect with other
carriers, however, Internet carriers should be required to permit new
interconnection at any facility where they currently interconnect.
Additionally, to take care of situations of localized monopoly power,
carriers should have the right to demand interconnection with other Internet
carriers if they can demonstrate that there is no reasonably available facility
268for direct or indirect interconnection. As a result, a legal rule requiring
267. Of course, the network's flexibility may stand in the way of certain applications,
such as streaming video or high-bandwidth interactive gaming. These applications would
benefit from a more programmable network that would permit network resources to be
prioritized and devoted to these more time-sensitive applications. See Reed et al., supra note
115, at 70; Craig Partridge et al., in Commentaries on "Active Networking and End-to-End
Arguments," 12 IEEE NsrwoRK 66, 67-68 (May/June 1998).
268. This interconnection duty thus falls somewhat short of that required of incumbent
local exchange carriers, which are required to permit interconnection "at any technically
feasible point within the carrier's network." 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
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Internet backbones to interconnect for the exchange of TCP/IP traffic is
appropriate.
Although it is relatively easy to assert an interconnection obligation,
difficult issues inhere in the correlatives that arise when enforcing a duty to
interconnect. In particular, a bare interconnection obligation is probably not
very useful if it can be evaded by a carrier's agreement to interconnect, but
at an unreasonably discriminatory price. A carrier or user requesting
interconnection generally should not be permitted to simply complain that
the price is too high. Permitting such a complaint would open the door for
carriers to use the regulatory process to seek lower-than-justifiable prices.
Rather, the complaint should establish that the price or terms being offered
are discriminatory in that they are higher than those that generally prevail
in similar situations. Implementing the interconnection obligation therefore
requires some mechanism for the discovery of prevailing prices. In some
markets, this will be an easy matter, for the relevant prices will be publicly
available, and the only issue in a complaint will be whether the proposed
different price to the complainant is appropriate. In some markets, one
could imagine the FCC imposing a tariffing requirement, which has been
the traditional means of enforcing a common carrier's interconnection
obligation269  and is still employed in markets in which the
telecommunications carrier has market power.270 In general, however, the
better solution would be to require the complainant to file with the FCC,
which could, under its complaint power, exercise both its discretion and
expertise to decide whether there were sufficient merits to warrant theS 271
Commission discovering any previously private pricing information.
The interconnection obligation, of course, would not apply to all
Internet participants. It would not, for example, apply to private corporate
networks that interconnect with the Internet for Web or e-mail services.
These networks are not common carriers in any sense, because they do not
272
undertake to serve any segment of the public at large. The
interconnection obligation would also not apply to Web hosting services or
data centers, for these services are likely to be competitive and likely do
not exhibit network externalities. In this regard, the interconnection
proposal here differs from the one proposed by Eli Noam, who has argued
269. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 139, at 1331-33.
270. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace,
Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Comm. Act of 1934, as amended, Second Report
and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 20,730, 4 Comm. Reg. 1199 (1996) (detariffing long-distance
service because it was competitively provided), aff'd, MCI v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (2000).
271. Compare id. paras. 21-25 (discussing FCC's ability to use its complaint authority to
resolve discrimination claims, even in the absence of filed tariffs).
272. Compare supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 54
INTERNET INTERCONNECTION
that the economic disadvantages that common carriers suffer compared to
private carriers will inevitably end the era of common carriage. 273 Noam's
interconnection obligation appears to require a private network that
interconnects with the public networks to permit any and all traffic from
274the public network 4. The proposal here is more optimistic than Noam's
about the likelihood of maintaining the core of common carrier service, but
agrees on the importance of interconnection.
A specific interconnection obligation also seems superior to simply
relying on the antitrust laws to combat market failures resulting in lack of
interconnection. First, because antitrust litigation requires extensive
discovery to establish proof of market power, an antitrust claim is likely to
prove difficult and costly to prosecute.275 Indeed, MCI's litigation against
AT&T, which was based upon serious and repetitive anticompetitive
activities by AT&T, did not by itself result in any substantial change in
AT&T's behavior.276 AT&T did agree to divest itself of the Bell companies
as the result of government antitrust litigation, but that result came eight
years after the government instituted the case and thirty-three years after
the government originally tried by antitrust means to control AT&T's anti-
competitive behavior.277 The Internet market likely cannot tolerate such
delays. Second, because of the technical detail that may be inherent in such
cases, it seems better to have them handled by an expert agency such as the
FCC, at least in the first instance, rather than by courts of general
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, it does seem important to grant the FCC (or other
regulator) forbearance power to be exercised after a comprehensive and
open inquiry into the nature of competition. To date, the FCC has not
undertaken such a proceeding with respect to Internet markets. If it did, it
might be conclusively demonstrated that at least some segments of the
industry do not need interconnection regulation. If so, the FCC could
forbear under powers similar to those it has to forbear from applying the
Communications Act to those telecommunications markets that do not need
regulation. Notably, however, even that authority requires the FCC to find
more than simply that the market is competitive; it requires a finding that
273. See Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common
Carriage, 18 TELEcOMM. POL'Y 435 (1994).
274. Id. at 452.
275. Mark L. Azcuemga, Market Power as a Screen in Evaluating Horizontal Restraints,
60 ANTIRUsT L.J. 935, 936, 940 (1992).
276. See MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
277. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 139-41 (D.D.C. 1982) (case filed in
1974); id at 135-36 (discussing earlier antitrust litigation filed against Bell System in 1949).
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• .278deregulation is in the public interest.
Moreover, the common carrier interconnection obligation does not
require a carrier to develop a wholesale arrangement or to otherwise
unbundle its own services for the retail sale of third parties. This is
particularly important in the cable open access debate. The solution
imposed as a condition of the AOL/TW merger,279 as well as the solutions
sought by most advocates of open access, 2s0 is to require the cable company
to set a "wire only" price and to permit unaffiliated ISPs to sell cable
modem services at retail to customers. But this inevitably requires a
regulatory agency to set prices, with no benchmark to other market prices.
And agency price-setting always carries the significant possibility of
distortion through inaccuracy or through abuse of the regulatory process.'8'
The common carrier approach would also require access to the names
and presence databases used in instant messaging, and it would require it
now, not in the future after even more services depend on it.2s2 The NPD
has the potential to be the addressing service operating at the same layer as
IP, and facilitating many services on top of it. In fact, as noted, IM has
already transcended text to include voice connections, file swapping, and
• 283
rudimentary multimedia services. But the common carrier approach
would not require the sharing of other infrastructure, such as the servers
actually used to exchange information or to manage the services provided.
That, again, would require price regulation and does not seem justified. The
278. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. V 1999) This section requires the Commission to:
forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of this Act... if...
enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the
charges... are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory... [if] enforcement of such regulation or provision is not
necessary for the protection of consumers; and [if] forbearance from applying
such provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest.
Id.
279. See AOlW Merger Order, supra note 38, para. II.A.2.
280. See Cooper, supra note 31, at 1041. Lemley and Lessig's most recent work does not
fully specify exactly what they mean by "open access." Lemley & Lessig, supra note 31, at
968-69 (saying that "open access is simply shorthand for a set of competitive objectives.").
Nevertheless, they are quite clear that a "click through system," by which cable operators
sell their high-speed Internet access through an affiliated ISP but then permit their
customers to reach other ISPs, is insufficient. See id. at 965-67; Mark A. Lemley &
Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REv. 3, at 25 (2000)
("click through" is inadequate; ISP and access services must be separated).
281. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
282. Compare Weiser, supra note 56, at 842-46 (evaluating FCC's IM conditions in
AOL/TW merger, and suggesting the need for a more comprehensive inquiry into
information platform regulation).
283. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 54
INTERNET INTERCONNECTION
common carrier approach also would not require interconnection of the
applications that utilize the NPD, although the interconnection of the NPD
may create more opportunities for such interoperability.
Finally, the interconnection obligation mandates that local telephone
companies interconnect directly with ISPs, without the need for an
intermediate local telephone company. Such an interconnection obligation
is necessary, as more than eighty percent of all Internet access subscribers
still rely on dial-up connections.28 This interconnection should be
accomplished, however, not based on the interconnection obligations of the
telephone companies, but those that arise specifically with regard to the
exchange of Internet traffic. This would be parallel to an interconnection
obligation applicable to any access provider-cable, wireless, or wireline.
Moreover, this interconnection obligation makes clear the fact that unique
pricing rules, such as prevailed in the FCC's first two attempts to solve the
reciprocal compensation controversy, are unnecessary.285
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of common carrier obligations, from the common law to
the Communications Act of 1934, provides a useful starting point for
considering regulation of Internet interconnection issues. That history
provides precedent for applying interconnection duties and
nondiscrimination requirements to backbone providers and other carriers of
Internet traffic, but fails to provide any precedent for open access rules for
high-speed Internet services. Evaluating those precedents, with an eye
towards the costs of regulation, suggests that Internet interconnection ought
to be mandated and backed up by a process that assures that
interconnection occurs. Moreover, the proposal advanced in this Article
creates an opportunity for the FCC to comprehensively evaluate the
structure of Internet markets.
The Internet is the bearer service of today and of the coming future,
much as railroads and telecommunications firms were in previous
generations. The history, economics, and technical dimensions of those
services demonstrate that they work best-and that the public is best
served-when there is a comprehensive interconnection requirement. It is
time for such a comprehensive approach to Internet interconnection.
284. See AOl1WMerger Order, supra note 38, paras. 68-72.
285. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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